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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FAIR USE 
DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM 
DOMAIN-NAME DISPUTE-RESOLUTION 
POLICY 
David A. Simon* 
Abstract: Since its inception in 1999, the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO) has resolved nearly 22,000 domain-name disputes un-
der the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP)—a 
mandatory arbitration policy implemented by the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The UDRP allows the holder of a 
legally protectable trademark to initiate proceedings to cancel a similar 
domain name or have it transferred to the trademark owner. Domain-name 
holders, though, have a number of defenses, including that they are using 
their domain names in a noncommercial, fair manner. Although several 
empirical studies have analyzed various aspects of the UDRP, none have 
specifically examined this fair use defense. This study does what others have 
not. It analyzes the fair use defense in decisions before WIPO. Using 
WIPO’s online decision database, this study makes two important findings. 
First, respondents from the United States are more likely than those from 
other countries to succeed on a fair use defense. Second, arbitrators from 
the United States are more likely than those from other countries to find 
that a respondent’s use of a domain name was fair. This means that, under 
the UDRP, respondents from the United States enjoy greater speech pro-
tections than those from other countries, and that arbitrators from the 
United States are more sympathetic to speech interests than arbitrators 
from other countries. To improve the UDRP, I propose two revisions. First, 
ICANN should adopt a choice of law provision stating that the law of the re-
spondent’s home country governs fair use disputes. Second, ICANN should 
implement a panel assignment provision in fair use disputes that requires 
arbitrators to share the nationalities of the litigants. 
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Introduction 
 Because domain names are valuable commodities,1 trademark 
owners attempt to control domain names that incorporate their trade-
marks. Sometimes they do this by preemptively “buying up” domain 
names that disparage their companies or executives, or direct users to 
websites that do so.2 But when another individual already owns such a 
domain name, the trademark owner must try to wrestle it away from 
the domain name owner.3 These are disputes over private censorship. 
They raise questions about what people on the Internet can say and 
how they can say it. 
 Although these disputes are amenable to traditional litigation, 
trademark owners frequently pursue a quicker, cheaper option:4 they 
file complaints under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution 
Policy (UDRP)5 with a domain-name arbitration “provider”6 such as 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).7 Under the 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See infra notes 45–88 and accompanying text. 
2 Bank of America recently bought domain names incorporating the name of its Chief 
Executive Officer, Brian Moynihan, including <BrianMoynihanBlows.com>. Hayley Tsuka-
yama, Bank of America Buys Up Anti-BoA Domain Names, Post on Faster Forward by Rob Pegoraro, 
Wash. Post (Dec. 23, 2010, 9:55 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/ 
2010/12/bank_of_america_buys_up_anti-b.html. 
3 See e.g., Gail Guarulhos Indústria e Comércio Ltda. v. Watson, No. D2006-0655 (WIPO 
July 7, 2006), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0655. 
html (finding fair use in a case in which the complainant’s business name included the word 
“gail” and the respondent registered <gail.com> because his wife’s given name was Gail); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. MacLeod, No. D2000-0662 (WIPO Sept. 19, 2000), http://www.wipo. 
int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0662.html (relating that respondent who 
registered <wal-martsucks.com> to criticize Wal-Mart lost UDRP dispute). 
4 See infra notes 45–87 and accompanying text. 
5 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names 
& Nos., http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last modified Sept. 6, 2011) [here-
inafter UDRP]. The UDRP also contains rules of procedure. Rules for Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last modified Sept. 6, 2011) [here-
inafter UDRP Rules]. 
6 There are four approved providers currently operating. In addition to WIPO, the 
three other providers are the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre, the Na-
tional Arbitration Forum, and the Czech Arbitration Court Arbitration Center for Internet 
Disputes. List of Approved Dispute Resolution Providers, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names 
& Nos., http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last modified 
June 9, 2011) [hereinafter List of Providers]. Since providers started hearing UDRP dis-
putes, two have gone defunct. These providers are CPR: International Institute for Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution and eResolution. Compare List of Providers, supra (listing current 
and former providers), with UDRP Providers, UDRPinfo.com, http://www.udrpinfo.com/ 
prov.php?b=22 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (listing providers as of 2002). 
7 WIPO is an agency of the United Nations. What Is WIPO?, World Intellectual 
Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Dec. 20, 
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UDRP, an alleged mark owner (“the complainant”)8 can attempt to 
cancel the domain name or transfer it from its owner (“the respon-
dent”)9 to the trademark holder.10 After filing, a panel of either one or 
three arbitrators is chosen to resolve the dispute.11 A respondent, how-
ever, can assert certain defenses by showing that she has “rights or le-
gitimate interests” in the domain name.12 One of these defenses allows 
the respondent to “make a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the 
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly di-
vert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.”13 
This defense—which I call “the fair use defense” —is a safety-valve for 
sometimes critical speech.14 
 But how, exactly, does the defense work in practice? More specifi-
cally, do panels apply the fair use provision uniformly to all respon-
dents? This Article presents empirical evidence that panels—U.S. pan-
els in particular—apply the fair use defense more favorably to U.S. 
respondents than to other respondents. My analysis of nearly one thou-
sand UDRP decisions rendered by WIPO between 1999 and 2010 sup-
                                                                                                                      
2011). Created in 1967 by the United Nations member states, WIPO’s mandate is to “pro-
mote the protection of [Intellectual Property] throughout the world.” Id. It is one of four 
currently operating UDRP providers. See List of Providers, supra note 6. 
8 The UDRP defines complainant as “the party initiating a complaint concerning a 
domain-name registration.” UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 1. 
9 The UDRP defines respondent as “the holder of a domain name registration against 
which a complaint is initiated.” Id. § 1. 
10 Id. § 3 (noting that upon receipt of a UDRP arbitration, the provider will cancel, 
transfer, or change the domain name). 
11 Arbitrators are drawn from an international pool of various ICANN- and WIPO-
approved individuals. See WIPO Domain Name Panelists, World Intellectual Prop. Org., 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/panel/panelists.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
Thus, arbitrators of various nationalities can and do sit on the same panel. When the ma-
jority of arbitrators on a three-member panel are from the United States, I refer to the 
panel as a “U.S. panel.” The same is true for a one-member panel with an arbitrator from 
the United States. When, however, the majority of arbitrators on a panel are from a coun-
try other than the United States, I refer to the panel as “non-U.S.,” “other,” or “foreign.” 
The same title applies to single-member panels of non-U.S. arbitrators. 
12 Compare UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(a)(ii) (stating as an element of the complaint that 
the complainant must show that the respondent “ha[s] no rights or legitimate interests in 
respect of the domain name . . . .”), with id. § 4(c) (“Any of the following circumstances, in 
particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evalua-
tion of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate your rights or legitimate interests to the 
domain name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii) . . . .”). 
13 Id. § 4(c)(iii). 
14 See, e.g., Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy” —Causes and 
(Partial) Cures, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 605, 642–43 (2002) (arguing that WIPO’s “rights and 
legitimate interests” defense seemed to quell initial worry about whether criticism, parody, 
and other speech interests would be protected by the UDRP). 
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ports this conclusion. The purpose of my analysis was to determine 
whether the nationality of respondents or panels influenced the out-
come of fair use cases. First, I analyzed whether respondents from the 
United States won more often than those from other countries. The 
data show that U.S. respondents won 35% of the time while other re-
spondents won only 17% of the time. Second, I analyzed whether U.S. 
panels were more likely to find fair use than non-U.S. panels. My data 
show that U.S. panels found fair use 36% of the time. Other panels, by 
contrast, found fair use only 20% of the time. These data suggest that 
WIPO panels apply the UDRP fair use defense more favorably to U.S. 
respondents than to other respondents. 
 Although a variety of factors likely are responsible for these phe-
nomena,15 I argue they occurred for two basic reasons. First, the UDRP 
contains a vague choice of law provision. This vagueness allowed WIPO 
panels to apply whatever law they “deem[ed] applicable.”16 U.S. panels 
then took greater advantage of this provision than their foreign coun-
terparts. In other words, U.S. panels began importing U.S. law—law 
that is generally (viewed as) more sensitive than the law of other coun-
tries to free speech interests—into UDRP disputes with higher fre-
quency than did foreign panels. More than non-U.S. panels, U.S. pan-
els also applied U.S. law in cases where the respondent was from the 
United States. Because U.S. law is (viewed as) more friendly to speech 
interests than foreign law, the use of U.S. law favored respondents. 
 But why did U.S. panels—and not foreign panels—apply their 
home country’s law? There are five potential reasons. First, because 
U.S. panels decide nearly fifty percent of all fair use cases, they have 
more opportunities than their foreign counterparts to import U.S. laws. 
Second, more than U.S. arbitrators, other arbitrators believe that the 
UDRP should be a uniform policy. To preserve uniformity, other arbi-
trators do not apply other countries’ local laws—be it the arbitrators’, 
complainants’, or respondents’ law(s)—to decide UDRP disputes. 
Third, other arbitrators do not think about what law to apply. Because 
they view the UDRP as precedential, they simply apply prior decisions. 
The UDRP contains a U.S./non-U.S. dichotomy in terms of rules about 
fair use. With two rules to choose from, arbitrators did not invent new 
ones. Fourth, much more than U.S. panels, foreign panels decide cases 
                                                                                                                      
15 I did not run a regression using my data. Therefore, my data are descriptive. My ar-
gument is based only on these descriptive data. I do not purport to account for other fac-
tors that could be influencing the findings; indeed, there may be other factors that are 
influencing the data. I leave that statistical analysis for another study. 
16 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 15(a). 
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involving parties of nationalities different than the (foreign) panel. Fi-
nally, many countries do not have cybersquatting laws, or trademark 
laws with as many speech protections as U.S. laws. Without law—or law 
that is as speech-friendly—to apply, panels from other countries simply 
rely on the language of the UDRP (which may better reflect their own 
countries’ laws). That is, they interpret the UDRP as a self-contained 
document, rather than import local legal rules or principles. 
 The importation of U.S. law has practical consequences. As differ-
ent panels applied different rules, two competing sets of rules arose in 
fair use cases. The first set adheres to U.S. laws. The second set is com-
prised of sui generis UDRP rules developed by WIPO panels (“WIPO 
Rules”). These rules then replicated as panels cited them in subsequent 
fair use cases. The practical effect was twofold. First, because the im-
ported U.S. law allowed individuals greater leeway to use trademarks in 
domain names than did WIPO Rules, the rule-dichotomy privileged cas-
es in which panels applied U.S. law. Second, this same “legal leeway” 
gave U.S. respondents a greater ability to “speak” than other respon-
dents. In other words, U.S. respondents could use others’ trademarks in 
their domain names in more situations than other respondents because 
arbitrators deciding cases with U.S. respondents usually applied U.S. law. 
 Although fair use is an important defense to protect speech inter-
ests, most empirical studies of UDRP cases do not focus on how panels 
interpret specific provisions. Instead they examine broader issues, such 
as the UDRP’s fairness or its potential to suppress speech generally. 
Some studies, for example, focus on respondents’ overall success rate in 
UDRP actions. One study found that the UDRP disfavors speech by 
those who do not hold trademarks—that is, it disfavors respondents.17 
The study notes that the UDRP, by giving complainants the ability to 
select an arbitration provider, encouraged forum shopping.18 To sup-
                                                                                                                      
 
17 Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: A Statistical Assessment of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy, 17 Info. Soc’y 151, 156 (2001) (noting that, in 2001, complainants won around 
eighty percent of disputes); see also Milton Mueller, Ctr. for Convergence & Emerging 
Network Techs., Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark Dis-
putes Under ICANN’s UDRP 1, 15 (2002), available at http://dcc.syr.edu/PDF/markle-
report-final.pdf (explaining that complainants win ninety-six percent of the time when a 
respondent defaults, admitting that sometimes default may indicate cybersquatting, but con-
cluding that many times defaulting respondents have valid defenses). 
18 Mueller, supra note 17, at 161 (“After only 1 year of operation, there is a statistically 
significant correlation between market share and the tendency to take away domain names 
from respondents.”). But see Ned Branthover, Int’l Trademark Ass’n, UDRP—A Suc-
cess Story: A Rebuttal to the Analysis and Conclusions of Professor Milton 
Mueller in “Rough Justice”  1, 4–7 (2002), available at http://www.inta.org/Advocacy 
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port this claim, the study pointed to data showing that the providers 
with the biggest market shares were also those with the highest com-
plainant win rates.19 
 Some were not convinced by this hypothesis. One study, for in-
stance, argued that provider selection is mostly a matter of provider 
efficiency rather than provider bias.20 In other words, the complainants 
choose providers that decide disputes the fastest.21 Results of that study 
showed that provider efficiency had been overlooked as a factor by pre-
vious studies.22 
 Further studies revealed other factors that helped explain out-
comes under the UDRP. One author, for example, used data on UDRP 
decisions to analyze the influence of panel size on outcomes (i.e., wins 
or losses).23 Under the UDRP, the complainant can elect to have the 
dispute heard by a one- or three-member panel.24 When the complain-
                                                                                                                      
 
/Documents/INTAUDRPSuccesscontraMueller.pdf (attempting to rebut Mueller’s analy-
sis). 
19 Mueller, supra note 17, at 161. 
20 Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services—An 
Empirical Re-assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 285, 
295–96 (2005) (“Using a multinomial logit regression model to determine if complainants 
select the provider based on bias or the duration of the procedure, we show that duration 
is at least as important as bias in selecting providers.”). 
21 See id. 
22 Still others have examined how cases are distributed among panels and providers. 
John Selby, Competitive Provider Selection Under the ICANN UDRP: Are ICANN’s Goals Being 
Achieved?, AusWeb (2004), http://ausweb.scu.edu.au/aw04/papers/refereed/selby/paper. 
html (noting, without performing any statistical tests, that “the Providers that resolve dis-
putes faster than average do have larger market shares,” and that, “although the time dif-
ferences are not that great between the slowest and fastest Provider’s Panels, it would ap-
pear that there is a slight correlation between the time taken to resolve a dispute and the 
market share of each Provider”). 
23 Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systematic Unfairness in the 
ICANN UDRP, 27 Brook. J. Int’l L. 903, 922 (2002) (explaining that respondents win 
more often with three-member panels than with one-member panels even when control-
ling for defaults); see also Mueller, supra note 17, at 15 (stating that, for disputes heard by 
the National Arbitration Forum, “[respondents that] have the resources to pay an addi-
tional $1500 to select one of three panelists . . . win slightly over half of the cases,” whereas 
respondents generally win only 33% of the time when they mount a defense and 1% of the 
time when they default). But see The UDRP: Fundamentally Fair, But Far from Perfect, 6 Elec-
tronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 937 (Aug. 29, 2001) (challenging Geist’s conclu-
sions regarding respondent win rates). 
24 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 3(b)(iv). In the complaint, the complainant must 
[d]esignate whether Complainant elects to have the dispute decided by a sin-
gle-member or a three-member Panel and, in the event Complainant elects a 
three-member Panel, provide the names and contact details of three candi-
dates to serve as one of the Panelists (these candidates may be drawn from 
any ICANN-approved Provider’s list of panelists) . . . . 
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ant elects a one-member panel, the arbitration provider selects the ar-
bitrator.25 How, exactly, each provider selects the arbitrator is un-
known.26 But the complainant need not elect a one-member panel— 
and the respondent need not accept one. Either party can elect that a 
three-member panel decide their case.27 When any party elects a three-
member panel, both parties must provide the names of three Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)-approved ar-
bitrators to the provider.28 The provider selects two arbitrators, one 
from each party’s list.29 It then selects the third arbitrator on its own “in 
a manner that reasonably balances the preferences of both Parties.”30 
Again, just how the arbitration provider makes its selection is un-
known.31 
 The author of one study decided to examine panel size after notic-
ing two facts. First, providers employed many of the same panelists.32 
Second, a discrepancy existed in respondent win rates among three 
providers (existing at the time).33 The author found that respondents 
won more often with three-member panels than with one-member pa-
nels.34 Because some providers employed more one-member panels 
than three-member panels, this fact explained the discrepancy in re-
spondent win rates.35 (The author also found that providers with the 
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
25 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 6(b). 
If neither the Complainant nor the Respondent has elected a three-member 
Panel (Paragraphs 3(b)(iv) and 5(b)(iv)), the Provider shall appoint, within 
five (5) calendar days following receipt of the response by the Provider, or the 
lapse of the time period for the submission thereof, a single Panelist from its 
list of panelists. The fees for a single-member Panel shall be paid entirely by 
the Complainant. 
Id. 
26 Geist, supra note 23, at 910 (“Although the ICANN Rules and provider supplemental 
rules indicate how panelists are selected, little is known about how providers determine 
precisely which panelists serve on what cases. Panelist allocation has become particularly 
important as the providers’ panelist rosters have converged.”). 
27 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, §§ 3(b)(iv), 5(v). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. § 6(e). 
30 Id. 
31 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
32 Geist, supra note 24, at 910 (footnote omitted). 
33 Id. at 911 (“[I]f many of the same panelists are deciding cases for multiple provid-
ers, how is it that complainants win over 80% of the time with WIPO and NAF, and only 
61% of the time with eResolution?”). 
34 Id. at 922. 
35 Id. 
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highest win percentage fed disputes to a small number of complainant-
friendly arbitrators.)36 The results did not change even when control-
ling for respondent defaults.37 In other words, panel size influenced 
the likelihood of a respondent winning. 
nels. 
                                                                                                                     
 All of these studies have offered reasons for general trends in 
UDRP disputes. None, however, focused on whether the fair use provi-
sion protects the speech of domain-name users.38 None, that is, ex-
plored how effectively the UDRP’s speech “safety valve” —fair use— 
operates. 
 This Article does just that. It reports the results of an empirical 
study examining how WIPO panels apply the UDRP in fair use cases. 
Specifically, it asks what factor(s) influence the probability that a re-
spondent will successfully defend a UDRP proceeding on fair use 
grounds. The data suggest that the answer is nationality: respondents 
from the United States won fair use cases more often than respondents 
from other countries. The data also show that panels with a majority of 
U.S. arbitrators (“U.S. panels”)39 found for respondents in fair use 
cases more often than did other pa
 Because the UDRP lacks a principled choice of law strategy and a 
clear panel assignment procedure, this Article recommends revising 
the UDRP in two ways. First, ICANN should change the current choice 
of law provision. The new choice of law provision should instruct pan-
els to apply the local law of the respondent’s home country. Second, 
ICANN should revise and make transparent its panel assignment pro-
 
36 Id. at 928. 
A review of the 3881 single-member panel cases as of February 18, 2002 indi-
cates that single panel cases may not be allocated in an entirely random man-
ner. Most disturbing are the case allocation trends at the NAF. Of the NAF’s 
1379 single-member panel cases, only six panelists decided an astonishing 
56.4% (778 of 1379) of the cases. The sheer number of cases assigned to only 
six people alone is surprising. The 778 cases represent 20% of the entire 
UDRP single panelist caseload. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
37 Id. at 924. 
38 But see Annette Kur, UDRP: A Study by the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign 
and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich 1, 30–32 (2002) 
(on file with author) (discussing various categories of cases including fair use, but attempting 
to explain the results of cases by legal rules rather than by contextual factors such as the 
identity of the parties involved). 
39 As noted in footnote 11, this term includes only cases where two or more U.S. panel-
ists appeared on a three-member panel. So, for example, I did not classify a panel as a 
“U.S. panel” if it contained arbitrators from the United States, German, and Spain. The 
coding protocols are contained in a separate document. 
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cedures. Given the proposed choice of law provision, ICANN should 
appoint to panels a majority of arbitrators from the same country as the 
respondent’s home country. Where the parties select a three-member 
panel, one arbitrator should be from the complainant’s home country. 
 Part I briefly explores the UDRP and how scholars have criticized 
it.40 Part II describes the methodology used to collect and analyze fair 
use UDRP decisions.41 Part III presents the study’s findings.42 Part IV 
discusses the implications of the findings, attempting to explain two 
phenomena.43 First, why do U.S respondents win more than other re-
spondents? Second, why do U.S. panels apply U.S. law more than other 
panels? This Part answers these questions using three tools: the UDRP’s 
choice of law provision, WIPO-specific rules, and panel nationality. Af-
ter this explanation, Part IV explores potential reforms that could be 
made to the UDRP. It suggests that ICANN should revise the UDRP’s 
choice of law and panel assignment provisions in fair use cases. 
I. The UDRP and Its Problems 
There can only be one website at www.barcelona.com. Should it belong to the 
city in Spain, or to Whit Stillman’s 1994 romantic comedy? The answer does 
not respect national boundaries. The [Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers, the] root authority[,] decides[] on behalf of every In-
ternet user everywhere in the world.44 
 ICANN is the “root authority.”45 Among other things, ICANN man-
ages the registration and allocation of domain names using the Domain 
Name System (DNS).46 Although the DNS was developed to allow the 
web to function effectively with increasing users and desire for names,47 
it also increased competition: with a limited number of names comes 
competition for those resources.48 As the Internet grew, so did disputes 
                                                                                                                      
 
40 See infra notes 45–87 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 88–110 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 111–135 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 136–262 and accompanying text. 
44 Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Bor-
derless World 31 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
45 See Milton Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming 
of Cyberspace 3, 7–10 (2002). Although ICANN is the primary “root authority,” other 
competing, independent roots exist. Id. at 54–56 (describing several alternative root serv-
ers, including Open NIC, Pacific Root, ORSC, New.net, Name.space, and CN-NIC). 
46 Id. at 41–45, 185–208. 
47 Id. at 41. 
48 See id. at 57–58 (analogizing the Internet to other “unowned” resources such as the 
ocean, where domain names are like fish or minerals—resources that engender competi-
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over domain names.49 In response, ICANN developed50 the UDRP to 
provide a quick and cheap alternative to litigating domain-name dis-
putes involving abusive domain-name registration;51 that is, disputes 
where a party registered domain names in “bad faith.”52 To ensure that 
the UDRP was more than just a fancy procedure, ICANN made it man-
datory by contracting with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) (now Veri-
sign),53 which, until 1999, registered all of the “.com” generic top-level 
domain names (known as gTLDs).54 As part of this contract, NSI incor-
porated the UDRP into all domain-name registration agreements.55 
This enables ICANN and NSI to bind to the UDRP all individuals who 
register a domain name.56 When ICANN allowed new registrars of 
gTLDs in 1999,57 it bound them to the UDRP as a condition of accredi-
                                                                                                                      
tion and produce ownership rules); see also Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN: Between the Public and 
the Private Comments Before Congress, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1071, 1079–83 (1999) (explain-
ing 
ing to commerce, with competition “endow[ing] . . . 
the 
w, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 359, 377–78 (2003) 
(ex
rt of the 
WIP
able
4(b). 
Registry Agreement, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos. 
§ 3(
ey register a domain 
nam r Assigned Names & 
Nos
how “entrepreneurial forces” altered the domain-name system, changing it from space 
allocated by one man ( Jon Postel) to governance by ICANN). 
49 Mueller, supra note 45, at 109, 114–19 (explaining that the commercialization of 
the Internet followed its 1991 open
name space with economic value” that, in turn, led to an increasing number of dis-
putes over various domain names). 
50 ICANN actually drew heavily on WIPO’s Report when developing the UDRP. See 
Froomkin, supra note 14, at 631–88 (explaining that ICANN adopted each of the major 
WIPO recommendations—use of the DNS to use mandatory contractual agreements, lim-
iting disputes to trademark and non-trademark holders, substantive rules governing dis-
putes, procedures for dispute resolution process, pre-emptive protections for well-known 
marks—and discussing the degree to which it did so regarding each recommendation); 
Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of La
plaining that ICANN asked WIPO to issue a report on domain-name disputes and that 
ICANN used the report as the basis of the UDRP). 
51 E.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN 
Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 191, 201 (2002) (stating that the 
UDRP was meant “to create a remedy for a narrowly defined group of particularly egregious 
cases,” which ICANN said would be “‘deliberate, bad faith, abusive, domain-name registra-
tions or ‘cybersquatting.’” (quoting World Intellectual Prop. Org., Final Repo
O Internet Domain Name Process § 135(i) (1999) [hereinafter Final Report], avail-
 at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-final1.pdf)). 
52 For a definition of “bad faith” under the UDRP, see UDRP, supra note 5, § 
53 Graham J.H. Smith, Internet Law and Regulation 153 (4th ed. 2007). 
54 Mueller, supra note 45, at 186–90, 192; Smith, supra note 53, at 153. 
55 ICANN-NSI 
A)(ii)(b), http://www.icann.org/en/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htm (last modi-
fied Nov. 10, 1999). 
56 The policy is contractual, and all individuals agree to it when th
e. Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, Internet Corp. fo
., http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/ (last modified Sept. 5, 2011). 
57 Mueller, supra note 45, at 188; Smith, supra note 53, at 155. 
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tation.58 Thus, all registrars are bound by the UDRP. When individuals 
register a domain name, they too become contractually bound to the 
DR
 not explain how they assign particular arbitra-
rs 
under the UDRP.64 As some authors note, the root—that is, ICANN— 
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 To provide a quick and cheap resolution of disputes involving do-
main names, the UDRP makes filing a claim simple: the owner of a reg-
istered or common law trademark asserts that a “domain name is iden-
tical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the 
complainant has rights . . . .”60 To assert a claim over a domain name, 
one must “submit[] a complaint in accordance with the [UDRP] and 
[the UDRP] Rules to any [one of four] Provider[s] approved by 
ICANN,”61 which includes WIPO.62 The provider (be it WIPO or oth-
erwise) then employs a panel of arbitrators to decide the dispute.63 As 
mentioned, providers do
to to serve on panels. 
 The UDRP thus regulates speech on the Internet. Since its incep-
tion in 1999, WIPO has resolved over 22,000 domain-name disputes 
 
58 Mueller, supra note 45, at 192 (stating that ICANN “bound all registrars of domain 
names under .com, .net, and .org to [the UDRP] as a condition of accreditation”). 
59 Id. (“Through their contracts with registrars, all registrants of domain names under 
the generic TLDs are contractually bound to submit to arbitration under the UDRP.”). 
60 UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(a)(i). The UDRP does not preclude litigation as a first-order 
remedy. Id. § 5. 
All other disputes between you and any party other than us regarding your 
domain name registration that are not brought pursuant to the mandatory 
administrative proceeding provisions of Paragraph 4 shall be resolved be-
tween you and such other party through any court, arbitration or other pro-
ceeding that may be available. 
Id.; UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 18(a)–(b) (stating rules for arbitrators when a party to the 
dispute commences litigation before or during a UDRP proceeding). 
61 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 3(a). 
62 There are a total of four providers. List of Providers, supra note 6. 
63 For information on how panels are selected, see supra notes 24–31 and accompany-
ing text. WIPO, for example, provides a list of its arbitrators. WIPO Domain Name Panelists, 
supra note 11. 
64 As of the time of this study in 2010, over 19,000 UDRP complaints had been filed 
with WIPO. Total Number of Cases per Year, World Intellectual Prop. Org. http://www. 
wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/cases.jsp (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). During this time 
WIPO decided 18,624 of these complaints. See Case Outcome by Year(s) (Breakdown), World 
Intellectual Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/outcome.jsp 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011). When the last comprehensive study of the URDP was con-
ducted in 2002, WIPO decided the majority of UDRP disputes (fifty-nine percent). UDRP 
Decisions, UDRPInfo.com, http://udrpinfo.com/dcsn.php (click on the “View” hyperlink 
next to “UDRP market share figures by provider”) (data reflect all decisions as of Feb. 18, 
2002). Extrapolating from this study, this means that as of February 2002, providers other 
than WIPO decided 12,942 disputes, for a total of 31,566 disputes. 
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decides how to settle these disputes.65 But, the question is how should 
the root decide? More precisely, what law applies? 
 The answer is unclear. When ICANN adopted the UDRP, it in-
cluded a provision that commands a panel to “decide a complaint on 
the basis of . . . any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable” 
(“choice of law provision” or “provision”).66 The UDRP does not, how-
ever, provide any guidance on when, if ever, to apply country-specific 
law. If panelists applied the UDRP in a nonprecedential manner,67 this 
would not necessarily be a problem. 
 But WIPO’s “consensus view” is that “panels consider it desirable 
that their decisions are consistent with prior panel decisions dealing with 
similar fact situations.”68 Yet, despite panels’ use of “precedents” from 
prior disputes, no precedent exists on how to apply the UDRP’s choice of 
law provision. WIPO, which ICANN charged with making recommenda-
tions for a UDRP,69 suggested that the UDRP use existing “multilateral” 
standards of intellectual property and apply them to domain names— 
though it was not clear exactly what standards applied.70 Even among 
                                                                                                                      
 
65 Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 44, at 31. 
66 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 15(a). It also included a provision that let panels “con-
duct the administrative proceeding in such manner as it considers appropriate in accor-
dance with the Policy,” even allowing panels to formulate their own rules on admissibility 
of evidence. Id. § 10(a), (d). 
67 WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Second Edition (“WIPO 
Overview 2.0”) § 4.1, World Intellectual Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/ 
domains/search/overview/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) [hereinafter WIPO Rules] (“Consensus 
view: The UDRP does not operate on a strict doctrine of precedent. However, panels con-
sider it desirable that their decisions are consistent with prior panel decisions dealing with 
similar fact situations. This ensures that the UDRP system operates in a fair, effective and 
predictable manner for all parties . . . .”). 
68 Id. Indeed, one scholar has shown empirically that the UDRP is a de facto prece-
dent-based system. In 2002, for example, he published results showing that over fifty per-
cent of UDRP decisions cite other UDRP decisions. Mueller, supra note 17, at 19. More 
significantly, “[t]he majority not only cite other cases but rely on precedent extensively to 
reason out and support their decisions.” Id. 
69 ICANN Staff Report: Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for gTLD Registrars, Internet 
Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos. (Aug. 24, 1999), http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/ 
santiago/udrp-staff-report.htm (stating that the U.S. Government, in its 1998 White Paper, 
created ICANN and “called upon ‘the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
to . . . develop recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain 
name disputes involving cyberpiracy . . . .’” (quoting Management of Internet Names and 
Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,747 ( June 10, 1998))). 
70 Final Report, supra note 51, § 34. 
It is further recognized that the goal of this WIPO Process is not to create new 
rights of intellectual property, nor to accord greater protection to intellectual 
property in cyberspace than that which exists elsewhere. Rather, the goal is to 
give proper and adequate expression to the existing, multilaterally agreed 
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academics, no clear consensus exists as to what law applies in any given 
dispute.71 Wherever a panel looks, it will find no clear guidance. 
 Because the choice of law provision does not specify how panels 
should apply it, panels have broad discretion in making that determina-
tion.72 That is troublesome because a panel’s decision to apply a par-
ticular law has important consequences. When a respondent wants to 
mount a fair use defense, for example, the choice of law issue can be 
determinative.73 Critics claim that this results in poorly reasoned or in-
consistent decisions. 
 Inconsistency occurs in two forms. First, panels can apply different 
UDRP precedents to similar fact-patterns.74 Alternatively, panels can 
                                                                                                                      
 
standards of intellectual property protection in the context of the new, multi-
jurisdictional and vitally important medium of the Internet and the DNS that 
is responsible for directing traffic on the Internet. 
Id. 
71 One author has argued that WIPO actually meant to incorporate traditional choice 
of law principles. See Froomkin, supra note 14, at 640. Others have disagreed. See Mueller, 
supra note 17, at 152 (describing one of the UDRP’s three main objectives as “creat[ing] 
global uniformity: that is, [it was designed] to eliminate variety and competition among 
the jurisdictions and rule sets applied to domain name-trademark conflicts”). 
72 Froomkin, supra note 14, at 643. 
[T]he subtlety of the choice of law issue has either been lost on some arbitra-
tors, or they have chosen to avert their eyes from it. Perhaps the arbitrators 
have concluded that “UDRP law” should, after all, be some free-standing body 
of rules deracinated from any legislature and made up largely by trademark 
lawyers. 
Id.; Thornburg, supra note 51, at 210 (noting that the choice of law provision has resulted 
in “eclectic and unprincipled ‘choice of law’ decisions,” has caused “uncertainty about 
applicable law,” and has “exacerbate[d] the differences among the decisions made by the 
unappealable arbitrators”); see Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-
National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 141, 225 (2001). 
Without constraints on these open-ended clauses, panels are left with little to 
guide the exercise of their discretionary lawmaking powers. Not surprisingly, 
this omission has produced a schism between panels that strictly construe the 
UDRP and those that interpret the Policy more expansively to curb a broader 
range of conduct by domain-name registrants. 
Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra, at 225. 
73 Froomkin, supra note 14, at 642 (“The choice of law issue is especially important be-
cause choice of law in effect determines what constitutes ‘rights and legitimate interests’ 
. . . .”). 
74 See Mueller, supra note 17, at 24 (“[T]he outcomes and precedents in [cases involv-
ing critics or commentary] are mixed, reflecting the lack of clear standards and dissension 
among panelists.”); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Commerce Versus Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody, 
and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1327, 1356 (2006) (“[T]here is 
no clear test as to when a commentary site is a fair or legitimate use. A comparison of two 
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apply different national law to disputes with similar facts or issues.75 
This latter scenario occurred in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walmarket Can-
ada, a 2000 WIPO case.76 In that case, the respondent operated in Thai-
land and was domiciled in Canada.77 The complainant, Wal-Mart, was 
headquartered in the United States.78 The panel noted that either Ca-
nadian or Thai law could apply.79 Then, however, it discussed and ap-
plied law from the United States and the United Kingdom—even though 
the parties’ dispute did not appear to implicate U.K. law.80 
 Why did this happen? One reason may be the panel’s nationality. 
That explanation is at least plausible in the Wal-Mart decision. There, 
the lone panelist was from the United Kingdom and applied U.K. law. 
In other cases, too, arbitrator nationality may help explain the out-
come. One author has suggested that UDRP disputes—as a result of 
UDRP drafting—focus on trademark law (when there are other meth-
ods of resolving domain-name disputes).81 For support, the author cites 
one WIPO case where the respondent and complainant both hailed 
from the United States.82 Although the author argues for non-
                                                                                                                      
early UDRP decisions involving consumer commentary and gripe sites demonstrates the 
confusion that can arise under the UDRP in this respect.”); Lisa M. Sharrock, The Future of 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution: Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions from Within the 
UDRP Framework, 51 Duke L.J. 817, 833–36 (2001) (discussing the application of two dif-
ferent rules in similar cases involving domain-name speculation and in cases involving 
criticism (i.e., <trademarksucks.com>) and arguing that the UDRP causes inconsistency 
“because it lacks specificity, a flaw magnified by the fact that precedent plays little role in 
UDRP decisionmaking”). 
75 See, e.g., David Wotherspoon & Alex Cameron, Reducing Inconsistency in UDRP Cases, 2 
Canadian J.L. & Tech. 71, 74–75 (2003) (explaining that, among other problems, panels 
can apply legal principles from jurisdictions that have no relation to the parties). 
76 No. D2000-0150 (WIPO May 2, 2000), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/ 
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0580.html. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (“Since the Respondent appears to be domiciled in Canada, any legal action 
would have to be taken against him in that country. If the Respondent is to operate in 
Thailand, then action could be taken there.”). 
80 Id. (stating and applying the “legal position in England on domain names of confus-
ingly similar wording to registered trademarks”). 
81 Lipton, supra note 74, at 1356 (“These decisions also show that, regardless of how 
the UDRP is drafted, UDRP arbitrators are likely to be influenced, at least to some extent, 
by domestic trademark laws.”). 
82 Id. at 1356 n.163 (“‘The discussion and decision herein will . . . be governed by the 
terms of the [UDRP], although reference by analogy may be made to principles of U.S. law, 
as two of the Complainants are U.S. corporations, Respondent is a U.S. resident, and both 
parties have cited U.S. law in their submissions.’” (quoting Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. 
Myers, No. D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/ 
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html)). 
2012] An Empirical Analysis of Fair Use Decisions 79 
trademark based tools to resolve these disputes, the observation none-
theless highlights the influence of national law in UDRP disputes.83 In-
deed, we might expect that the law of the panel’s home country will 
influence how the panel applies the UDRP. As noted above, this panel-
based explanation seems plausible in the Wal-Mart case.84 
 Panel nationality, however, highlights a broader concern: how are 
panels deciding cases? In particular, scholars are concerned with pan-
els’ ability and tendency to suppress speech by controlling domain-
name use. Some, for example, worry that decisional inconsistency 
could “chill speech.”85 Because people fear the cancellation or transfer 
of a selected domain name, the argument goes, they will be reluctant to 
use them at all. Others are concerned that providers like WIPO are bi-
ased in favor of the complainant.86 
 None of these studies, though, examined how specific provisions 
of the UDRP impact individuals’ ability to “speak” using domain names 
that incorporate trademarks—an issue of growing importance. As the 
number of trademarks and domain names multiply, people increasingly 
will use those trademarks in domain names. Yet one’s ability to use do-
main names will depend on how ICANN manages that space. Cur-
rently, gTLD space is both expanding and contracting. As ICANN 
opens new gTLDs, it restricts those able to apply for them.87 By limiting 
individuals’ and small businesses’ ability to use new domain-name 
                                                                                                                      
83 Id. at 1361–64 (arguing for a “zoning” approach that would give trademark holders 
the “most obvious .com versions of their trademarks in the domain space”). 
84 No. D2000-0150 (WIPO May 2, 2000). 
85 See Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: A Cheaper Way 
to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 211, 251–52 (2001) 
(quoting U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black and arguing that inconsistent or unclear 
law about what speech is permitted can chill protected speech). 
86 See supra notes 19–39 and accompanying text. 
87 See generally Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., gTLD Applicant Gui-
debook (2011), available at http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/rfp-clean-19sep11-
en.pdf (laying out the details for applying for new gTLDs). ICANN is introducing new 
gTLDs. Registering for these gTLDs, however, is, in ICANN’s words, “a much more com-
plex process” than registering for an existing gTLD. Frequently Asked Questions, Internet 
Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., http://newgtlds.icann.org/applicants/faqs/faqs-en 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011). Indeed, applying for a new gTLD requires, among other 
things, online user registration, application submission, fee submission, fee conciliation, 
and appropriate documentation. gTLD Applicant Guidebook, supra, § 1.1.1 (explaining 
the life cycle of new gTLDs), § 1.2.2 (listing required documents). To be eligible to regis-
ter, the entity seeking registration must be an “[e]stablished corporation[], organization[], 
or institution[] in good standing . . . . Applications from individuals[,] . . . sole proprietor-
ships[,] [and] . . . yet-to-be formed legal entities . . . will not be considered.” Id. § 1.2.1. 
What’s more: the evaluation fee for a new gTLD is expensive, with an estimated price of 
$185,000 (including a $5,000 deposit). Id. § 1.5.1. 
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space, the new gTLD policy shrinks rather than grows the existing 
space for these potential registrants. 
 This de facto shrinking and the prospect of new, expensive gTLDs 
amplify the importance of the fair use defense. With the growth of 
companies and internet access, people will continue to voice their opi-
nion using websites—and frequently domain names. The extent to 
which people will be able to use trademarks in their domain names de-
pends, at least in part, on the fair use defense. To date, however, no 
study has systematically examined this defense, and whether or how the 
fair use defense works; i.e., whether it applies uniformly to all parties, 
regardless of nationality. This study undertook this task. 
II. Methodology Used to Collect and Analyze  
Fair Use UDRP Decisions 
 This study examined fair use domain-name disputes arbitrated by 
WIPO under the UDRP. As mentioned above, section 4(c)(iii) of the 
UDRP allows respondents to “mak[e] a legitimate noncommercial or 
fair use of the domain-name [that incorporates a trademark], without 
intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tar-
nish the trademark or service mark at issue.”88 Nevertheless, to better 
understand where the fair use provision fits within the UDRP, it is help-
ful to describe the three main elements required to prove a prima facie 
case under the UDRP.89 
 First, the complainant must show that the “domain name is identi-
cal or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the 
complainant has rights . . . .”90 Second, the complainant must show that 
the respondent has no “rights or legitimate interests” in the domain 
name.91 Third, the complainant must show that the respondent “regis-
tered and is . . . us[ing] [the domain name] in bad faith.”92 The com-
plainant must make a prima facie case (on these elements) to suc-
                                                                                                                      
88 UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(c)(iii). 
89 In addition to substantive provisions, the UDRP contains a variety of procedural 
rules. See generally UDRP Rules, supra note 5. One such procedural mechanism is that the 
respondent must file a response within twenty days after receiving provider notification of 
the complaint. See id. § 5(a); id. § 4(c) (explaining that the proceeding commences when 
the provider fulfills its notification responsibilities under Rule 2(a)); id. § 2(a) (detailing 
the provider’s responsibility to forward the complaint to the respondent). Failure to file a 
response counts as a “default,” which simply means that the panels decide the case without 
a response. Id. § 14(a). A default is not an automatic loss. 
90 UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(a)(i). 
91 Id. § 4(a)(ii). 
92 Id. § 4(a)(iii). 
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ceed.93 Even if the complainant makes a prima facie case, though, the 
burden shifts, and the respondent may defeat the complaint by demon-
strating “rights or legitimate interests” in the domain name.94 
 The UDRP specifies three ways in which a respondent can have 
rights or legitimate interests in a domain name: the respondent (1) is 
using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of 
goods or services;95 (2) is commonly known by the domain name;96 or 
(3) is “making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain 
name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert con-
sumers or to tarnish the” plaintiff’s trademark.97 I examined only deci-
sions substantively discussing this last issue: whether the respondent’s 
use of the alleged mark in the domain name qualified as legitimate 
noncommercial or fair. I refer to these decisions as “fair use cases.” Fig-
ure 1 (below) shows the process by which I selected, sampled, and cate-
gorized cases. The following two Sections explain this process in detail. 
A. Sample Selection: Method of Selection 
 WIPO makes all of its decisions publicly available and text-
searchable on its website (“WIPO database”).98 I collected cases de-
cided between January 1, 1999 and September 24, 2010. I searched the 
WIPO database using only one search term, “4(c)(iii),”99 indicating 
that the search results (i.e., the decisions) “must” contain this phrase.100 
                                                                                                                      
93 WIPO Rules, supra note 67, § 2.1 (“[A] complainant is required to make out a prima 
facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests.”). 
94 Id. 
Once such prima facie case is made, the burden of production shifts to the re-
spondent to come forward with appropriate allegations or evidence demon-
strating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. If the respondent 
fails to come forward with such appropriate allegations or evidence, a com-
plainant is generally deemed to have satisfied paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the UDRP. 
Id.; see also UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(c)(i)–(iii) (describing ways in which a domain name 
owner can show rights or legitimate interests in a domain name). 
95 UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(c)(i). 
96 Id. § 4(c)(ii). 
97 Id. § 4(c)(iii). 
98 Search WIPO Cases and WIPO Panel Decisions, World Intellectual Prop. Org., http:// 
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). Because extracting the 
decisions from WIPO’s database, WIPO changed its search interface. This new interface does 
not extract results in the same manner as the interface I used to conduct my search. 
99 Section 4(c)(iii) of the UDRP governs “fair use” of domain names. UDRP, supra note 
5, § 4(c)(iii). 
100 I collected cases using a search on September 24, 2010. I have not updated cases 
since. 
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The search revealed 2688 non-unique results from January 1, 1999 
through September 24, 2010.101 These decisions appeared in languages 
other than English.102 
                                        
Figure 1: Case Selection and Sampling Method 
 
 After compiling the sets of search results, I eliminated the dupli-
cate cases. This left 1415 unique cases. I first randomly sampled 499 
decisions. From this sample, I found only a small number of respon-
dent wins. Because the number of wins was too small to draw inferences 
(n < 20), I drew another random sample of 500 cases. From the ran-
dom sample totaling 999 decisions, I found 148 cases that substantively 
discussed the fair use defense. In 40 of those cases, the respondent 
                                                                              
101 “Non-unique” results contain duplicate decisions. 
102 To review cases not in English, I used GoogleTranslate. 
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won. The complainant won in the remaining 108 decisions. I did not 
examine the remaining 416 cases. 
B. Types of Cases Selected for Sample 
 I manually reviewed all 999 randomly sampled cases to determine 
whether they were relevant. Relevant decisions included two kinds of 
cases. First, I identified cases in which the respondent succeeded in de-
fending the complaint on fair use grounds. I identified these cases eas-
ily because the panels would discuss why the domain name constituted 
a noncommercial fair use.103 Put simply, a respondent who succeeds on 
a fair use defense defeats the complaint; i.e., the respondent “wins.”104 I 
identified forty of these decisions. 
 Second, I identified cases in which, although the respondent lost, 
the panel discussed fair use in the decision. Nearly every case I exam-
ined, however, mentioned section 4(c)(iii) in some way. Often, for ex-
ample, decisions would summarily find no fair use defense, or cite the 
relevant provision but never discuss it. Therefore, I had to narrow the 
cases to those in which the panel substantively addressed the fair use 
defense. 
 Generally, I excluded decisions finding no fair use because the 
website was commercial. I kept cases in which the panel decided the 
case on commerciality grounds but noted that the website may have 
been for a legitimate purpose, such as criticism.105 Because these cases 
specifically addressed whether a use was fair and legitimate, they were 
relevant. I excluded cases in which the panel decided summarily that 
the respondent used the domain name commercially. Including these 
cases would have skewed the results because this criterion encompassed 
nearly every case where a respondent lost. 
 When the respondent lost and its domain name did not display a 
live website, I included only those cases where the respondent asserted 
that it was planning on making a fair use. I included these cases for 
consistency, as some respondent fair use victories occurred when the 
                                                                                                                      
103 For respondent wins, the decision must have resolved the fair use issue in the respon-
dent’s favor. I did not count decisions that punted on the fair use question but dismissed the 
complaint on other grounds. E.g., Kendall v. Mayer, No. D2000-0868 (WIPO Oct. 26, 2000), 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0868.html. 
104 If the respondent succeeded in proving a fair use defense as well as another de-
fense under the UDRP, I coded the case because it still qualifies as one in which the re-
spondent won on fair use grounds. 
105 E.g., Pfizer Inc. v. e2eTech LLC, No. D2007-0099 (WIPO Apr. 6, 2007), http:// 
www.udrpsearch.com/wipo/d2007-0099. 
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respondent had not yet developed a website. Like the aforementioned 
commerciality cases, I included these cases because they substantively 
addressed the issue of fair use. For the opposite reason, I excluded cas-
es in which the panel summarily rejected the respondent’s fair use de-
fense; namely, because they did not substantively discuss fair use. 
 Occasionally, a decision would defer the fair use discussion to the 
section on bad faith—one of three elements the complainant must show 
to win a UDRP complaint.106 I included these decisions and classified 
them as “other” unless the bad faith discussion turned specifically on 
the nature of the website (i.e., criticism, fan, information, and per-
sonal). If the bad faith discussion turned on the nature of the site, I clas-
sified it as one of the existing categories. I included these decisions be-
cause the primary issue—regardless of where in the decision the panel 
resolved it—was whether the respondent made a fair use of the domain 
name. Because the fair use inquiry sometimes rolled into the bad faith 
question, it made sense to include cases where this overlap occurred. 
 I also eliminated cases in which, although the panel discussed fair 
use to some degree, fair use was not really disputed. So, for example, I 
excluded cases in which, even though the panel discussed the fair use 
defense, the website that the domain name displayed was simply a por-
nographic one.107 I excluded these cases because they did not substan-
tively implicate the fair use defense. 
 I also excluded decisions involving websites that offered only ad-
vertisements or domain names that displayed a “parked” website con-
taining links to other vendors or websites. I excluded these cases be-
cause they generally could not qualify as either noncommercial or 
fair,108 and, as a result, the respondent could not and would not assert a 
fair use defense. In general, panels tended to resolve these cases sum-
marily in favor of the complainant. 
 After obtaining all 148 cases substantively discussing the fair use 
defense, I coded them for a variety of variables. One variable was sub-
                                                                                                                      
106 UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(a)(iii) (requiring the complainant to show that, in addition 
to the domain name being confusingly similar to the trademark and the respondent not 
having rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, it has been registered and is be-
ing used in bad faith). 
107 E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Horner, No. D2002-0029 (WIPO Feb. 27, 2002), http:// 
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0029.html. 
108 But see CP Masters B.V. v. RareNames, WebReg, No. D2009-1673 (WIPO Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2009/d2009-1673.html (finding 
the registration of a domain name “speculatively, to either generate click-through revenue 
and be part of the portfolio of domain names in which the Respondent deals” fair because 
no bad faith existed). 
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ject-matter: each case fell into a category that designated the type of site 
displayed upon entering the domain name. I coded them into five cat-
egories: criticism, fan site, informational, personal, and other. “Criti-
cism” means that the website displayed at a domain name made critical 
statements about some subject. The most common subject was the 
trademark holder, who was seeking to cancel or transfer the domain 
name. “Fan site” means that a supporter or proponent of a topic, per-
son, or entity created the website displayed at the domain name. “In-
formational” means that the website displayed at the domain name 
provided information about some kind of topic, person, or entity. Fre-
quently this was the trademark owner who attempted to cancel or trans-
fer the domain name. “Personal” means that an individual created a 
website displayed at the domain name for personal use, such as e-mail 
or displaying family photographs. “Other” refers to fair use decisions 
that did not fit any of these categories. 
 I also coded for other variables, including (1) panel, respondent, 
and complainant nationality; (2) whether the panel cited U.S. law, for-
eign law, or neither; and (3) whether the respondent won in whole or 
in part. 
 I coded the nationality of each arbiter using WIPO’s website, 
which lists its arbitrators by country.109 I coded the nationality of re-
spondents and complainants using the decision itself, which indicated 
from where the parties hailed. 
 I also coded whether and what law each panel cited. Whenever a 
decision either mentioned or listed the law of another country, it was 
counted as “citing” that country’s law. Occasionally, a decision would 
cite a non-national law, such as a law of the European Union. These 
decisions also were counted as “citing” foreign law. 
 Of course, my analysis would have been incomplete without cod-
ing for the ultimate result of the case. Here, I coded whether a respon-
dent “won” on the fair use defense. Given that multiple domain names 
may have been at issue, a respondent could win the dispute and lose the 
fair use defense in the same case. Thus, I recorded whether the re-
spondent won as to all domain names (a “whole win”) or as to less than 
all the domain names at issue (a “partial win”). I also recorded whether 
the respondent “lost” on the fair use defense (and typically, but not al-
ways, on all defenses).110 
                                                                                                                      
109 See WIP Domain Name Panelists, supra note 11. 
110 For a detailed description of how the variables were coded, please refer to the pro-
tocols, which are available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/bclaw 
review/pdf/53_1/simon_protocol.pdf. 
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III. Findings 
 The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the nation-
ality of respondents or panels influenced the outcome of fair use pro-
ceedings. First, I analyzed whether respondents who were from the 
United States won more often than those from other countries.111 Sec-
ond, I analyzed whether U.S. panels were more likely to find fair use 
than non-U.S. panels.112 Third, I analyzed the nationalities of panels 
and respondents in fair use cases.113 I report the findings in the next 
three Sections. 
A. U.S. Respondents Win Twice as Many Fair Use Cases as Other Respondents 
 Figure 2 shows that U.S. respondents won twice as often as other 
respondents. Specifically, U.S. respondents won 35% of the time while 
other respondents won only 17% of the time. The differences were sta-
tistically significant (p = 0.016).114 
Figure 2. Respondents’ Outcomes in UDRP Fair Use Cases, by Respondent Nationality 
 Respondent  
Wins 
Respondent 
Losses Total 
U.S. 
Respondent 
29 
(35%) 
54 
(65%) 
83 
(100%) 
Other 
Respondent 
11 
(17%) 
54 
(83%) 
65 
(100%) 
Total 40 
26% 
108 
74% 
148 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Fisher’s Exact showed the differences were statistically significant (p = 0.016). 
 
These data also show that respondents in fair use cases win 26% of the 
time. That is slightly higher than the overall percentage of respondent 
                                                                                                                      
111 See infra notes 114–120 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 121–127 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text. 
114 I used a Fisher’s Exact test to compute statistical significance. A Fisher’s Exact test is 
used to make comparisons across a two-by-two table (i.e., to compare proportions). H. 
Russell Bernard, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Ap-
proaches 569–70 (2000); Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Statistics for Law-
yers 154–56 (2d ed. 2001). Typically, a Fisher’s Exact test is used when the cells in a table 
have an expected value of below five (i.e., for a small sample). Bernard, supra, at 569. The 
test tells us the likelihood that our table shows an actual difference (i.e., that the differ-
ences are not a result of chance). See id. at 569–70; Finkelstein & Levin, supra, at 156 n.2. 
Put another way, it tells us in Figure 2, for example, that we could expect these results by 
chance 1.5% of the time. 
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wins (20%) found in the last comprehensive empirical study.115 The 
differences in the proportions of respondent wins in fair use cases 
compared to WIPO decisions generally was not statistically significant (z 
= -1.76, p = 0.08).116 
 In addition to respondent nationality, I tested panel nationality 
against respondent nationality. Figure 3 shows that respondents win 
more often when a U.S. panel decides the dispute than when a panel 
from another country decides the dispute. Respondents win 36% of the 
time when a U.S. panel decides their case and 20% when a panel from 
another country does so. The difference was statistically significant (p = 
0.04). 
Figure 3. Respondents’ Outcomes in UDRP Fair Use Cases, by Panel Nationality 
 Respondent  
Wins 
Respondent 
Losses Total 
U.S.  
Panel 
24 
(36%) 
43 
(64%) 
67 
(100%) 
Other  
Panel 
16 
(20%) 
65 
(80%) 
81 
(100%) 
Total 40 
27% 
108 
73% 
148 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Fisher’s Exact showed the differences were statistically significant (p = 0.040). 
 
 After grouping the cases into criticism and noncriticism categories, 
U.S. respondents won more than other respondents in both categories. 
(“Noncriticism” cases mean all cases that did not involve the “criticism” 
category described in the previous Part.)117 The differences in winning 
percentage, however, were statistically significant only for noncriticism 
cases. That is, U.S. respondents won more often than other respon-
dents in both criticism and noncriticism cases. But in only noncriticism 
cases were those differences statistically significant. Figure 4 shows that, 
in criticism cases where in which respondents won, U.S. respondents 
comprised 70% of cases and won 37% of the time.118 
                                                                                                                      
115 Geist, supra note 23, at 910 (stating “that complainants win 80.6% of the time with 
WIPO”); see Mueller, supra note 17, at 156–57 (showing a roughly 80% win-rate for com-
plainants in all cases in which a WIPO panel rendered a decision). 
116 I used a proportions test to generate the z-statistic. I ran the test based on the num-
ber of WIPO cases reported on UDRPinfo.com (2565). UDRP Decisions, supra note 64 (click 
the “View” hyperlink for “UDRP market share figures by provider”). 
117 See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text. 
118 I found that, in criticism cases, respondents won approximately 30% of the time. 
Another author found that respondents won 36% of the time in cases classified as “critic or 
commentary.” Mueller, supra note 17, at 11. 
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Figure 4. Respondents’ Outcomes in UDRP Criticism Fair Use Cases,  
by Respondent Nationality 
 Respondent Wins 
Respondent 
Losses Total 
U.S. 
Respondent 
14 
(37%) 
24 
(63%) 
38 
(100%) 
Other  
Respondent 
6 
(22%) 
21 
(78%) 
27 
(100%) 
Total 20 31% 
45 
69% 
65 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Fisher’s Exact showed the differences were not statistically significant (p = 0.278) (one-tailed, p = 
0.162). 
 
Other respondents, by contrast, comprised only 30% of the cases and 
won 22% of the time. The differences fell short of statistical signifi-
cance (n = 63, p = 0.278) (one-tailed, p = 0.162).119 
 In noncriticism cases in which the respondent won, U.S. respon-
dents comprised 75% of the cases and won 33% of the time. Other re-
spondents comprised 25% of the cases and won 13% of the time. As 
Figure 5 shows, the differences in win percentage for U.S. and other 
respondents for noncriticism cases were statistically significant (n = 83, 
p = 0.041) (one-tailed, p = 0.028).120 
Figure 5. Respondents’ Outcomes in UDRP Noncriticism Fair Use Cases, 
by Respondent Nationality 
 Respondent 
Wins 
Respondent 
Losses Total 
U.S. 
Respondent 
15 
(33%) 
30 
(67%) 
45 
(100%) 
Other  
Respondent 
5 
(13%) 
33 
(77%) 
38 
(100%) 
Total 20 
24% 
63 
76% 
83 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Fisher’s Exact showed the differences were statistically significant (p = 0.041) (one-tailed, p = 0.028). 
 
 Although the difference between the winning percentage of U.S. 
and non-U.S. respondents was not statistically significant, I still needed 
to examine panel nationality. The difference in winning percentage 
between U.S. and non-U.S. panels was significant for criticism but not 
noncriticism cases. Figure 6 shows that U.S. panels find for respondents 
                                                                                                                      
119 I used a Fisher’s Exact to test the differences. 
120 I used a Fisher’s Exact to test the differences. 
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in 50% of the cases compared to 18% for other panels. This difference 
was statistically significant (n = 65, p = 0.012). 
Figure 6. Respondents’ Outcomes in UDRP Criticism Fair Use Cases, by Panel 
Nationality 
 Respondent 
Wins 
Respondent 
Losses Total 
U.S. 
Panel 
13 
(50%) 
13 
(50%) 
26 
(100%) 
Other 
Panel 
7 
(18%) 
32 
(82%) 
39 
(100%) 
Total 20 
31% 
45 
69% 
65 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Fisher’s Exact showed the differences were statistically significant (p = 0.012) (one-tailed, p = 0.007). 
 
 The story for noncriticism cases is different. Figure 7 shows that 
respondent wins and losses differ based on the nationality of the decid-
ing panel. In cases decided by U.S. panels, respondents won 27% of the 
time. When other panels decided the case, respondents won 21% of 
the time. The difference between these percentages, however, was not 
statistically significant (n = 83, p = 0.798). 
Figure 7. Respondents’ Outcomes in UDRP Noncriticism Fair Use Cases, by Panel 
Nationality 
 Respondent 
Wins 
Respondent 
Losses Total 
U.S. 
Panel 
11 
(27%) 
30 
(73%) 
41 
(100%) 
Other 
Panel 
9 
(21%) 
33 
(79%) 
42 
(100%) 
Total 20 
24% 
63 
76% 
83 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Fisher’s Exact showed the differences were not statistically significant (p = 0.615) (one-tailed, p = 0.375). 
 
 To summarize, the data revealed two findings. First, U.S. respon-
dents win more often in fair use cases than respondents from other 
countries. Second, in fair use cases, U.S. panels rule for respondents 
more often than panels from other countries. Respondent nationality 
and panel nationality have opposite relationships with criticism and 
noncriticism cases. In noncriticism cases, the respondent’s nationality is 
related to whether they win or lose their fair use defense. The same is 
not true in criticism cases—respondent nationality is not related to 
whether the respondent wins a fair use dispute. Panel nationality shows 
just the opposite. In noncriticism cases, the nationality of the panel is 
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not related to the outcome. In criticism cases, however, U.S. panels de-
cide more disputes in favor of the respondent than other panels. 
B. U.S. Law Dominates UDRP Decisions 
 To investigate further, I determined whether and when panels 
cited U.S. law in their decisions. To qualify as “citing” U.S. law, a panel 
merely had to cite a U.S. case in any portion of the decision. In many 
decisions, panels cited U.S. law in discussions of subjects other than fair 
use. I used the “citation anywhere” criterion because many fair use de-
cisions did not cite U.S. law in their fair use discussion. Nevertheless, a 
citation to U.S. law in another part of the decision shows that the panel 
considered U.S. law in some respect. Because it was difficult to devise a 
metric that would measure the influence of U.S. law, this variable is an 
indication of whether U.S. law influenced the decision making process. 
 Even those numbers alone, however, would not tell the whole story. 
Recall that the primary findings show that U.S. panels give, and U.S. 
respondents get, more favorable treatment than other panelists or re-
spondents. Thus, it is important to see both the nationality of the panels 
citing U.S. law and the nationality of the respondents in cases where pa-
nels cite U.S. law. Figures 8 and 9 show the data for these two groups. 
 Overall, panels cited U.S. law in fair use cases 30% of the time. Pa-
nels cited foreign law in fair use cases only 6% of the time. In the re-
maining 64% of fair use cases, panels did not cite any nation’s law. 
Figure 8. Panels Citing U.S. Law in UDRP Fair Use Cases, by Respondent Nationality 
 U.S. Law 
Cited 
Foreign Law 
Cited No Law Cited Total 
U.S. 
Respondent 
34 
(41%) 
1 
(1%) 
48 
(58%) 
83 
(100%) 
Other 
Respondent 
10* 
(15%) 
8 
(12%) 
47 
(73%) 
65 
(100%) 
Total 44 
30% 
9 
6% 
95 
64% 
148 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Yates’ Chi-Square showed the differences were statistically significant, X2(2, N = 148) = 13.837, p< 
0.000. 
*Three additional cases cited U.S. law and foreign law, so I excluded them from the U.S. Law 
Category.121 
                                                                                                                      
121 Coast Hotels Ltd. v. Lewis, No. D2009-1295 (WIPO Nov. 23, 2009), http://www. 
udrpsearch.com/wipo/d2009-1295; Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v. MapleOne Solutions, 
No. D2003-0326 (WIPO June 16, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/ 
html/2003/d2003-0326.html; Espirito Santo Fin. Grp. S.A. v. Colman, No. D2001-1214 
(WIPO Jan. 22, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-
1214.html. Excluding these cases entirely does not alter the chi-square analysis. 
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Figure 8 also shows the data specific to respondent nationality. Panels 
cited U.S. law in 41% of cases with U.S. respondents. By contrast, they 
cited U.S. law in only 15% of cases with other respondents.122 
 I also examined patterns of foreign law citations. In cases with U.S. 
respondents, panels almost never cited or applied foreign law. In cases 
where the respondent was not from the U.S., however, panels cited for-
eign law 12% of the time. These were statistically significant, X2(2, N = 
148) = 13.837, p = 0.000.123 
 Finally, I investigated the nationalities of panels applying U.S. law. 
If a panel-specific legal bias exists, it would manifest itself in citation 
patterns. Figure 9 shows that U.S. panels cited U.S. law 47% of the time 
and cited foreign law 0% of the time.124 
Figure 9. Panels Citing U.S. Law in UDRP Fair Use Cases, by Panel Nationality 
 U.S. Law 
Cited 
Foreign Law 
Cited No Law Cited Total 
U.S.  
Panel 
32 
(47%) 
0 
(0%) 
35 
(52%) 
67 
(100%) 
Other  
Panel 
12* 
(15%) 
9 
(11%) 
60 
(74%) 
81 
(100%) 
Total 44 
30% 
9 
6% 
95 
64% 
148 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Yates’ Chi Square showed the differences were statistically significant, X2(2, N = 148) = 17.572, p < 
0.000. 
*Three additional cases cited U.S. law and foreign law ,so I excluded them from the U.S. Law Category. 
They were included in Foreign Law Citations.125  
 
Other panels cited U.S. law 15% of the time, and cited foreign law 11% 
of the time. The differences were statistically significant X2 (2, N = 148) 
                                                                                                                      
122 Additionally, panels applied U.S. law in 20% of the cases with U.S. respondents. In cas-
es with other respondents, however, panels applied U.S. law 6% of the time. The differences 
were statistically significant (n =148, p = 0.017). Simply applying U.S. law did not always 
mean the respondent won. E.g., Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks & Walmarket Puerto Rico, 
No. D2000-0477 (WIPO July 20, 2000), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/ deci-
sions/html/2000/d2000-0477.html. 
123 I used a Yates’ Chi-Square to test these differences. Yates’ Chi-Square is a version of 
Chi-Square used with small samples. Bruce M. King, Patrick J. Rosopa & Edward W. 
Minium, Statistical Reasoning in the Behavioral Sciences 375 (6th ed. 2011). It is 
designed to reduce the overestimation of statistical significance by reducing the value of 
X2, which makes statistical significance less likely. Id. The Chi-Square uses a sample fre-
quency or proportion to test a hypothesis about a corresponding population from which 
the sample is drawn. Frederick J. Gravetter & Larry B. Wallnau, Statistics for the 
Behavioral Sciences 607 (8th ed. 2009). 
124 See infra Figure 9. 
125 Coast Hotels, No. D2009-1295; MapleOne Solutions, No. D2003-0326; Espirito Santo, No. 
D2001-1214. Excluding these cases entirely does not alter the chi-square analysis. 
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= 17.572, p = 0.000.126 U.S. panels found fair use in most of the cases 
(75%) in which they applied U.S. law.127 
C. U.S. Panels Decide Mostly Cases Involving U.S. Respondents 
 To investigate nationality further, I examined the nationality of 
panels deciding cases with U.S. respondents. The Introduction explains 
the UDRP’s procedures for selecting both one-member and three-
member panels.128 In spite of the procedures, little is known about how 
WIPO (and other providers) select specific arbitrators.129 Figure 10 
shows that most cases that U.S. panels decide involve U.S. respondents. 
Other panels, by contrast, decided mainly cases with respondents from 
other countries. 
Figure 10. Nationality of Panels Deciding Fair Use Cases, by Respondent Nationality 
 U.S. Panel Other Panel Total 
U.S. 
Respondent 
56 
(67%) 
27 
(33%) 
83 
(100%) 
Other 
Respondent 
12 
(18%) 
53 
(82%) 
65 
(100%) 
Total 68 
46% 
80 
54% 
148 
100% 
Source: WIPO Online Database of UDRP Decisions 
A Fisher’s Exact showed the differences were statistic ly significant (p = 0.00) al
 
The differences were statistically significant (p = 0.00). Additionally, 
U.S. panels are deciding almost 46% of all fair use cases, compared 
with 54% for other panels. 
 But how does this compare to the number of arbitrators by nation-
ality? There are a total of 453 WIPO arbitrators.130 Of those, 109 are 
from the United States.131 The remaining 344 arbitrators are from oth-
er countries.132 Thus, of all WIPO arbitrators, 24% are from the U.S. 
and the remaining 76% are from other countries. Figure 11 shows that, 
after the United States, the next four countries with the highest per-
                                                                                                                      
126 Again, I used a Yates’ Chi-Square to test these differences. 
127 Of the fifteen cases decided by U.S. panels that applied U.S. law, eleven found fair 
use. 
128 See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text. 
129 Geist, supra note 23, at 910 (“Although the ICANN Rules and provider supplemen-
tal rules indicate how panelists are selected, little is known about how providers determine 
precisely which panelists serve on what cases. Panelist allocation has become particularly 
important as the providers’ panelist rosters have converged.”) (footnote omitted). 
130 WIPO Domain Name Panelists, supra note 11. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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centage of arbitrators are the United Kingdom (10%), Australia (6%), 
Switzerland (5%), and France (5%).133 
Figure 11. Proportion of WIPO UDRP Arbitrators, by Arbitrator Nationality 
Arbitrator Nationality Number of Arbitrators Proportion of Arbitrators(%) 
United States 109 24% 
United Kingdom 46 10% 
Australia 29 6% 
Switzerland 23 5% 
France 22 5% 
All Others 225 50% 
Total 453 100%  
Source: WIPO online list of arbitrators. The list is not entirely accurate as several arbitrators that decided 
disputes were not listed in this database. 
 
The other fifty countries not listed in Figure 11 comprised the remain-
ing 50% of arbitrators. So, although U.S. arbitrators comprise 24% of 
all arbitrators, U.S. panels decided 45% of all fair use cases. In other 
words, U.S. panels are assigned to more than their proportional share 
of fair use cases. 
 But, there is one other question: who are the respondents when 
the U.S. panels decide fair use cases? If they are from the United States, 
then the difference between the total percentage of U.S. arbitrators 
and the percentage of U.S. panels deciding fair use can be explained by 
a panel assignment policy: WIPO assigns U.S. panels to decide cases 
involving U.S. respondents.134 Specifically, of the sixty-seven cases de-
cided by U.S. panels, fifty-two involved U.S. respondents and U.S. com-
plainants. Of those cases, four cases involved only U.S. respondents. 
Five other cases included only a U.S. complainant. 
 Thus, the data show that 78% of cases with U.S. panels involved 
U.S. respondents and complainants. When I included all cases that in-
volved at least one U.S. party, that number jumped to 88%. Only in 
12% of all cases decided by U.S. panels was neither party from the 
United States. Put simply, most U.S. panels decided cases involving at 
least one party from the United States. 
 Panels from countries other than the United States had lower 
rates. Figure 12 shows that other panels decided cases involving parties 
                                                                                                                      
133 The following are the country-specific number of arbitrators: United Kingdom 
(forty-five), Australia (twenty-nine), Switzerland (twenty-three), and France (twenty-two). 
Id. 
134 Because three-member panels decided only twenty out of 148 cases (13.5%), WIPO 
assigned arbitrators in 86.5% of all cases. 
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with no relation to their home countries much more frequently than 
U.S. panels. 
Figure 12. Cases in Which at Least One Party Is from the Same Country as the Panel,  
by Total Number of Cases Decided 
Panel Country  Number of Cases At Least 1 Party From Panel Country (%) 
 United States 67 59 (88%) 
 Australia 20 4 (20%) 
 United Kingdom 16 8 (50%) 
 Canada 9 2 (22%) 
 New Zealand 7 1 (14%) 
 
 To summarize, the data show three things. First, panels deciding 
cases with U.S. respondents cited U.S. law more frequently than panels 
with other respondents. Second, U.S. panels cited U.S. law more fre-
quently than other panels cited U.S. law. In fact, the respondent won 
every case in which a U.S. panel cited U.S. law. Finally, U.S. panels de-
cided mostly cases with at least one U.S. party.135 Other panels, by con-
trast, decided a majority of cases in which neither party shared the 
same nationality as the panel. 
 When combined with the previous findings, the data show that, in 
fair use cases decided by WIPO, U.S. panels provide, and U.S. respon-
dents receive, treatment more favorable than panels or respondents 
from other countries. I refer to these phenomena as “U.S. Favoritism.” 
IV. Implications: Explaining U.S. Favoritism and  
Reforming the UDRP 
 These findings raise two issues. First, what explains U.S. Favoritism? 
Second, given this explanation, what reforms, if any, should ICANN 
make to the UDRP? 
A. Explaining U.S. Favoritism 
 Two factors help to explain U.S. Favoritism. The first is the UDRP’s 
choice of law provision. The second is panel nationality. But before 
reaching the issue of panel nationality, this Section addresses WIPO’s 
                                                                                                                      
135 Out of all 148 disputes, 83 (56%) involved U.S. respondents. See supra Figure 2. In 
all disputes before WIPO, U.S. respondents comprise nearly 37% of all respondents. Re-
spondent Country Filing (Ranking), World Intellectual Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/ 
amc/en/domains/statistics/countries.jsp?party=R (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
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official opinion on rules applied by panels.136 Although not a factor 
that caused U.S. Favoritism, it does elucidate how the phenomenon 
arose. Thus, the analysis proceeds in three steps. First, this Section dis-
cusses how the choice of law provision’s vagueness enabled panels to 
cite and apply—or avoid citing and applying—local (national) law.137 
Second, it explains how WIPO Rules that favored U.S. parties devel-
oped, and thus contributed to U.S. Favoritism.138 The Section ends with 
a discussion of how panel nationality, combined with the choice of law 
provision and WIPO rules, played a role in U.S. Favoritism.139 
1. Choice of Law Provision Influences What Law Applies 
 The UDRP’s choice of law provision can help explain why U.S. Fa-
voritism exists. As noted in Part I, the choice of law provision is open 
ended: it gives panels discretion to apply any “principles of law that 
[they] deem[] applicable.”140 One could construe this as a command 
to apply the law of a party’s home country. Indeed, panels in fair use 
cases do just that in 41% of the cases involving U.S. respondents. But, 
not all panelists follow that route. Sometimes arbitrators in fair use 
cases apply the law of their own country.141 U.S. panels do this in 47% 
of all cases they hear; other panels do this in less than 12% of cases. 
More often, however, arbitrators apply no law; instead, they invent or 
adopt UDRP rules to govern particular factual situations. These differ-
ent applications show that panels in fair use cases have not developed a 
consistent method of choosing nations’ laws. They have, though, cited 
U.S. law more often than other nations’ laws in fair use cases. The ques-
tion then becomes, why? Part of the answer lies in the rules WIPO pan-
els have developed and applied in fair use cases. 
                                                                                                                     
2. WIPO Rules of Decision 
 In February 2005, WIPO published on its website a variety of rules 
its panels have developed, entitled “WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel 
Views on Selected UDRP Questions” (“Rules” or “WIPO Rules”).142 
 
 
136 See infra notes 140–198 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 140–141 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 142–158 and accompanying text. 
139 See infra notes 159–198 and accompanying text. 
140 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 15(a); supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. 
141 No arbitrators apply their home country’s law when it differs from the law of the 
parties’ respective countries. 
142 WIPO Rules, supra note 67. 
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These Rules developed inductively—much like common law.143 For the 
most part, they represent an informal consensus or agreement on how 
to apply a rule in a given factual situation.144 Although the Rules are 
not binding, panels frequently cite them: out of the eighty-three fair 
use cases included in my sample since 2005, twenty-seven decisions (or 
32%) explicitly cited WIPO’s Rules (discussed below). Given that these 
Rules represent de facto precedents,145 a WIPO Rule favoring U.S. re-
spondents (or disfavoring other respondents) in fair use cases could 
help explain U.S. Favoritism. 
 On certain issues, WIPO Rules have “split” into two competing 
viewpoints.146 One set of these Rules addresses domain names used for 
criticism websites (“Criticism Rules”).147 The second set of Rules relates 
to fan sites (“Fan Site Rules”), websites about famous people created by 
fans or supporters.148 
 The first Criticism Rule explains that “[t]he right to criticize does 
not extend to registering a domain name that is identical or confus-
ingly similar to the owner’s registered trademark or conveys an associa-
                                                                                                                      
While some of [the listed] issues arise only infrequently, all of them are, or 
are perceived to be, relevant to the operation of the UDRP. On most of these 
issues, consensus or clear majority views have developed. Certain other ques-
tions attract a diversity of views. The WIPO Center’s identification of ques-
tions and careful and conservative evaluation of opinions is based on some 
20,000 UDRP cases it has administered through March 31, 2011. 
Id. 
143 Id. (“On most of these issues, consensus or clear majority views have developed. Cer-
tain other questions attract a diversity of views.”) (emphasis added). 
144 Id. 
145 Mueller, supra note 17, at 19 (explaining that, in 2002, over half of the UDRP de-
cisions cite other UDRP decisions, and that “[t]he majority [of these decisions] not only 
cite other cases but rely on precedent extensively to reason out and support their deci-
sions”). 
146 E.g., Asset Loan Co. Pty Ltd v. Rogers, No. D2006-0300 (WIPO May 2, 2006), 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0300.html. The court 
noted that, although 
a number of distinguished Panelists take the view that a bona fide non-
commercial criticism site connected to a domain name featuring the trade 
mark of a subject of the criticism is fair use of the domain name for the pur-
poses of the Policy[,]’ . . . Other panelists . . . have taken a contrary view. 
Id. (quoting Bonneterie Cevenole S.A.R.L. v. Sanyouhuangong, No. D2001-1309 (WIPO 
Jan. 21, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-1309. 
html). 
147 WIPO Rules, supra note 67, § 2.4. 
148 Id. § 2.5. 
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tion with the mark.”149 The second Criticism Rule notes that, 
“[i]rrespective of whether the domain name . . . connotes criticism,” 
the respondent can make a noncommercial use of the mark in the do-
main name of a criticism site.150 WIPO goes on to assert that “[i]n cases 
involving only US parties or the selection of a U.S. mutual jurisdiction, 
panelists tend to adopt the reasoning in [the second Rule] (though not 
universally).”151 It does not, however, explore this phenomenon fur-
th  
 The other potentially relevant set of Rules involves fan sites. These 
Fan Site Rules are similar to those WIPO has recognized in criticism 
cases.
er.
                                                                                                                     
152 The first Fan Site Rule states that domain names incorporating 
trademarks can be distinguished either by other words or by the con-
tent of the site.153 In other words, fan sites can avoid an adverse deci-
sion if they are “clearly distinctive from any official site.”154 The second 
Fan Site Rule states that any domain name that incorporates the 
trademark is confusingly similar to the trademark.155 The number of 
cases involving fan sites is small (n = 16). There are only three cases in 
which respondents won (19%).156 Two of those cases—Société Anonyme 
 
149 Id. § 2.4 (“The right to criticize does not necessarily extend to registering and using 
a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s trademark.”). 
150 Id. (“[T]he respondent has a legitimate interest in using the trademark as part of 
the domain name of a criticism site if such use is fair and noncommercial.”). 
151 Id. 
152 See id. § 2.5. 
153 WIPO Rules, supra note 67, § 2.5 (“View 1: The registrant of an active and non-
commercial fan site may have rights and legitimate interests in the domain name that in-
cludes the complainant’s trademark. The site should be actually in use, clearly distinctive 
from any official site, and noncommercial in nature.”). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
View 2: A respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in express-
ing its view, even if positive, on an individual or entity by using an identical or 
confusingly similar domain name, if the respondent is intentionally misrepre-
senting itself as being (or as in some way associated with) that individual or 
entity, or seeks to derive commercial advantage from its registration and use. 
Also, where the domain name is identical to the trademark, panels have 
noted that such respondent action prevents the trademark holder from exer-
cising its rights to the trademark and managing its presence on the Internet. 
Id. 
156 Estate of Francis Newton Souza v. ZWYX.org Ltd., No. D2007-0221 (WIPO June 18, 
2007), http://www.udrpsearch.com/wipo/d2007-0221; Société Anonyme de La Colline 
Champel v. Angelini, No. D2005-1059 (WIPO Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.wipo.int/amc/ 
en/domains/decisions/html/2005/d2005-1059.html; 2001 White Castle Way, Inc. v. Ja-
cobs, No. D2004-0001 (WIPO Mar. 26, 2004), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/de- 
cisions/html/2004/d2004-0001.html. 
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de La Colline Champel v. Angelini, in 2005, and White Castle Way, Inc. v. 
Jacobs, in 2004—involved U.S. respondents.157 All three of these cases 
s applied the Rules 
is related to both panel and respondent nationality. 
. P
the panel from a country other than the United States.160 Additionally, 
     
applied the first Fan Site Rule. 
 These Rules explain at least part of U.S. Favoritism. Recall that, in 
criticism cases, U.S. respondents won more often than other respon-
dents.158 The data show that the Criticism Rules and Fan Site Rules 
have been applied to and favor U.S. respondents, though the effect of 
the latter Rules is not large. WIPO also has stated as much by recogniz-
ing that the Criticism Rules exist and apply in cases involving some U.S. 
party or panel. Although 43% of all fair use cases are criticism cases, the 
Criticism Rules may help to explain U.S. Favoritism. The difference 
between U.S. and non-U.S. respondent winning percentages in criti-
cism cases is not significant (p > 0.05). More importantly, though, the 
differences between respondent winning percentages when U.S. and 
non-U.S. arbitrators decide their case is significant (one-tailed, p = 
0.007). Thus, while WIPO Rules can help explain U.S. Favoritism, the 
Rules cannot explain everything. Indeed, how panel
3 anel Nationality 
 Panels seem to have created the speech-friendly Criticism Rule by 
repeatedly applying U.S. law, or what they perceive to be U.S. law.159 
Why, though, did panels import U.S. laws into the UDRP? The primary 
explanation seems to be panel nationality. Out of the twenty-one fair 
use cases in which U.S. law has been applied, only four times (19%) was 
                                                                                                                 
157 See Angelini, No. D2005-1059; Jacobs, No. D2004-0001. 
158 U.S. respondents win thirty-eight percent of the time in criticism cases. Other re-
spondents, however, win only twenty-one percent of the time. See supra Figure 4. 
159 Indeed, all five decisions cited by WIPO as examples of this Rule involve U.S. re-
spondents and U.S. panels applying U.S. law. WIPO Rules, supra note 67, § 2.4 (citing: (1) 
Sutherland Inst. v. Continuative LLC, No. D2009-0693 (WIPO July 10, 2009), http://www. 
wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2009/d2009-0693.html (complaint denied); 
(2) Sermo, Inc. v. CatalystMD, LLC, No. D2008-0647 (WIPO July 2, 2008), http://www. 
wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2008/d2008-0647.html (complaint denied); (3) 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. McCauley, No. D2004-0014 (WIPO Apr. 22, 2004), http:// 
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2004/d2004-0014.html (complaint de-
nied); (4) TMP Worldwide Inc. v. Potter, No. D2000-0536 (WIPO Aug. 5, 2000), http://www. 
wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0536.html (complaint denied); (5) 
Brid
 
gestone Firestone, Inc., v. Myers, No. D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000), http://www.wipo. 
int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html (complaint denied)). 
160 RapidShare AG v. Yanpeng, No. D2010-0893 (WIPO July 28, 2010), http://www. 
wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/text.jsp?case=d2010-0893; Ryanair Ltd. v. Coulston, No. 
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as noted, U.S. panels found in favor of fair use more than their foreign 
counterparts in criticism cases. 
 Why might U.S. panels have done this? One explanation is sheer 
opportunity. The United States has the highest percentage of arbitra-
tors, comprising 24% of all WIPO arbitrators. As noted in Part II, the 
next four countries with the highest proportion of arbitrators are the 
United Kingdom (10%), Australia (6%), Switzerland (5%), and France 
(5%).161 Additionally, U.S. panels are deciding nearly 50% of all fair 
use cases. 
 The parties’ nationality might also have influenced U.S. panels’ 
decisions to import U.S. law. Most cases decided by U.S. panels (75%) 
involved both U.S. respondents and complainants. When you include 
all cases that involve at least one U.S. party that number jumps to 88%. 
Thus, in addition to the sheer number of cases U.S. panels have de-
cided, the parties involved may influence the decision to apply U.S. law. 
 U.S. panels primarily are responsible for importing U.S. legal prin-
ciples into the UDRP. And, typically, this occurs when resolving a dis-
pute involving U.S. parties. So the nationalities of the parties and the 
panels seem to matter. Once imported, the law is used to decide a dis-
pute. This, in turn, results in a rule that reflects U.S. law, which WIPO 
panels perceive as more protective of free speech than most other 
countries.162 
 Although it is unclear whether that perception of U.S. law is accu-
rate, it seems likely to be. U.S. trademark law, for example, allows for 
criticism, comment, and even parody of mark, though typically not 
when the use of the mark is confusing.163 Of the thirty-three other 
countries whose arbitrators decided cases in my study, it seemed that 
the laws of most other countries did not attempt to further similar poli-
                                                                                                                      
D2006-1194 (WIPO Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/ 
html/2006/d2006-1194.html; Sabanci v. iu, No. D2003-0498 (WIPO July 23, 2003), http:// 
www d2003-0498; Voigtländer GmbH v. John Voigtlander, No. D2003-
0095
hen the use parodies 
or c )(3)(B) (establishing a fair use defense for dilution for 
new
.udrpsearch.com/wipo/
 (WIPO Apr. 18, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2003/ 
d2003-0900.html. 
161 See supra Figure 11. 
162 This may be because U.S. trademark law allows for uses of marks in order to criti-
cize or comment on them, either under the fair use defense or a parody defense. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006) (establishing a fair use defense for dilution w
riticizes the mark); id § 1125(c
s reporting and news commentary); David A. Simon, The Confusion Trap: Rethinking 
a Defense for Parody in Trademark Law (forthcoming presentation). 
163 See Simon, supra note 162. 
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cies.164 There were, however, some exceptions. In Germany, for exam-
ple, one court has held that the German Constitution provides a de-
fense for satirical uses of trademarks.165 Other countries, like France, 
exempt from liability noncommercial “informational” and “political” 
uses of trademarks.166 Other countries, like Brazil, exempt from liability 
“noncommercial,” “truthful” trademark uses, but also “prevent refer-
ence to the mark in speeches or publications” when the reference is 
m
-
tio
co mercial and causes “detriment to the trademark.”167 
 On the whole, most countries did not expressly exempt uses for 
comment, criticism, parody, or satire. Even the European Union’s (EU) 
Directive to harmonize European Community trademark law does not 
specify any free speech protections for parody, commentary, or criti-
cism.168 Indeed, at least one court in Europe (the Austrian Supreme 
Court) has ruled that the EU Directive in conjunction with an EU Regu
la n prohibits parodic uses of trademarks on commercial products.169 
 That said, the Directive does provide some safeguards, though they 
are not robust. Article 3, for example, states that certain words cannot 
be registered as trademarks, such as those without distinctive charac-
ter.170 Likewise, Article 6 limits the rights of mark owners by allowing 
                                                                                                                      
164 To determine whether other countries had trademark laws that accommodated free 
dents from liability for expres-
sive
nfringement that the mark was used for in-
form
r of a mark may not . . . [p]revent ref-
eren
emark”). 
 as aphrodisiac diluted the VIA-
GRA erman court 
dec
), 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, 27. 
speech interests I consulted two sources: Ethan Horwitz, World Trademark Law and 
Practice (2d ed. 2011) and Edward J. Fennessy, Trademarks Throughout the World 
(5th ed. 2011). Using these two sources, I searched the law of each country for whether 
the law permitted “expressive uses.” Loosely defined, this meant that I searched for wheth-
er the law immunized from liability criticism, comment, parody, or satire of trademarks. 
Because these sources provided mere synopses of many countries’ laws, it was difficult to 
determine whether the law punished or exempted respon
 uses. If the source did not affirmatively indicate that a country’s law immunized ex-
pressive uses, I presumed that the law punished such uses. 
165 2-7 Horwitz, supra note 164, § 7.01[4] (“It is also a defense to infringement if the 
mark is used in a satirical way based on the constitutional freedom of art.”). 
166 FRA-7 id. § 7.01[4] (“It is a defense to i
ation purposes and not for commercial or advertising purposes. The use of the mark 
in a political statement is not infringement.”). 
167 BRA-7 id. § 7.01[4] (noting that “[t]he owne
ce to the mark in speeches or publications, as long as it is done with no commercial 
connotation and no detriment to the trad
168 See Directive 2008/95/EC, Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to 
Trade Marks, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25 (EU). 
169 Ferdinand Graf, Supreme Court Rules on Permissibility of Trademark Parodies, Int’l Law 
Office (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.glpi.com.br/templates/conteudo_geral_en.aspx?page= 
2497&idiom=1 (noting that the Austrian Supreme Court held, on September 22, 2009, that 
the STYRIAGRA mark used on pumpkin seeds and touted
 mark and explaining how the Austrian Supreme Court distinguished the G
ision allowing the use of the mark on parody grounds). 
170 Council Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 3(1)(b
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for uses of a trademark to describe or compare products.171 Despite 
these limited protections, some argue that the EU Directive has an ad-
itio
 
at 
ective; thus, they are the default 
sion. In only six cases did a panel discuss whether to apply a particular 
cou
                                                                      
d nal safeguard: it limits liability only to those uses “in the course of 
trade.”172 
 So, some panels developed competing rules based on their per-
ception of U.S. and non-U.S. law. As other panels draw on that rule, it 
replicates and becomes more prevalent. Indeed, WIPO’s Criticism 
Rules illustrate this fact.173 Although WIPO acknowledges that some 
U.S. component plays a role in the Criticism Rules, it does not claim
th panels are applying U.S. law. Instead, the Criticism Rules are based 
on panel decisions. Some of these decisions, of course, cited U.S. law. 
 In contrast, foreign law has not birthed any specific rule in fair use 
cases. This is likely because panels have imported other countries’ laws 
a total of six times, with only Spain’s laws referenced more than 
once.174 As a result, no other country’s law has influenced the applica-
tion of the UDRP to the extent as U.S. law. Or, perhaps all other coun-
tries’ laws are just less speech prot
UDRP Rule. The outcome is a division in UDRP application: panels 
apply either U.S. law or a sui generis UDRP rule. 
 Still, the question lingers: why have panels not imported foreign law? 
Unfortunately, most panels do not even discuss the choice of law provi-
ntry’s law.175 Sometimes, other cases would discuss why a potential 
                                                
 Madrid v. Morán Llanes, No. D2008-1400 
(WI
/ 
domai
175 009), 
http:/ ith & 
Onean r. 25, 
2009) l. 
 
171 Id. art. 6, at 29. It is interesting to note that the Directive uses the word “unfair” five 
times, but never once uses the word “fair.” See id. 
172 Id. art. 5, at 29 (providing rights “to prevent all third parties not having [the trade-
mark owner’s] consent from using [the mark] in the course of trade”). 
173 WIPO Rules, supra note 67, § 2.4. 
174 Consejería de Sanidad de la Comunidad de
PO Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2008/ 
d2008-1400.html; Canonais, S.L. v. Díaz Ros, No. D2000-0592 (WIPO Oct. 2, 2000), http:// 
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0592.html; Metro Bilbao, S.A. 
v. Fernández, No. D2000-0467 (WIPO Aug. 31, 2000), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en
ns/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0467.html. 
 Coast Hotels, Ltd. v. Lewis & UNITE HERE, No. D2009-1295 (WIPO Nov. 23, 2
/www.udrpsearch.com/wipo/d2009-1295; Grupo Costamex, SA de C.V. v. Sm
done Private Registration / 1&1 Internet Inc., No. D2009-0062 (WIPO Ma
, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2009/d2009-0062.htm
Accordingly, the Panel is not disposed to apply either the law of the United 
States of America (the country of domicile of the Respondents and the regis-
trar) or the law of Mexico (the Complainant’s country of domicile), in decid-
ing whether the Respondents’ website as it stood on June 12, 2008, consti-
tuted a use of the Domain Name falling within paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the 
Policy. Nor is the Panel attracted to the idea, proposed in the Sermo, Inc. case, 
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split arose in the Criticism Rules (e.g., the United States has a strong 
tradition of free speech that other countries do not share).176 It did 
not, however, discuss the choice of law provision or the merits of apply-
ing a particular country’s law. 
               
 One explanation for the lack of foreign law, then, is thoughtless 
panels. Foreign panels do not think that choice of law is an issue war-
ranting attention. But that explanation is not very helpful. It is still im-
portant to know why panels seem indifferent to choice of law issues. 
 One arbitrator suggests that the reason is that panels from coun-
tries other than the United States favor a “unified” or “self-referential” 
UDRP.177 That is, panels favor a UDRP that develops and applies its 
own, independent rules over one that relies on local laws.178 Why? Be-
cause the UDRP and trademark laws serve different purposes: “[T]he 
Policy and local laws as to cybersquatting and trademark infringement 
                                                                                                       
ticular national law by which to judge the concepts of ‘fair’ and ‘le-
omingo González Ruiz, No. D2001-1202 (WIPO Dec. 12, 2001), 
http:
, 2001), http:// 
www ml/2000/d2000-1698. html; Bridgestone Fire-
ston
that conflicts of laws provisions should be applied to assist in the selection of 
some par
gitimate’ in paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy. The interpretation of a stan-
dard-form contract (i.e., that between a domain name registrant and the do-
main name registrar), the relevant terms of which are mandated by the Policy 
and have been designed to operate in a cross-border environment, should not 
differ in accordance with the location or nationalities of the parties, the regis-
trar, or the panel, and nor should it depend on the location of the relevant 
website. 
Grupo, D2009-0062; see also 1066 Housing Ass’n Ltd. v. Morgan, No. D2007-1461 (WIPO Jan. 
18, 2008), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-1461.html; 
Heineken España, S.A. v. D
//www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-1202.html; Arthur Guinness 
Son & Co. (Dublin) Ltd. v. Dejan Macesic, No. D2000-1698 (WIPO Jan. 25
.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/ht
e, Inc. v. Meyers, No. D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/ 
domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html. Although the Grupo panel rejected the 
choice of law issue, it went on to apply U.S. law’s initial interest confusion doctrine to find 
bad faith. No. D2009-0062. 
176 E.g., CBS Broad. Inc. v. Z. aghloul, No. D2004-0988 (WIPO Feb. 5, 2005), http:// 
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2004/d2004-0988.html. 
177 1066 Housing Ass’n, No. D2007-1461. 
178 Id. (agreeing with a previous decision that found that, “‘[a]s a matter of principle, this 
Panel would not have thought that it was appropriate to import unique national legal princi-
ples into the interpretation of paragraph 4(c) of the Policy. This is so even if the effect of 
doing so is desirable in aligning decisions under the Policy with those emerging from the 
relevant courts and thus avoiding instances of forum shopping” (quoting Covance, Inc. & 
Covance Labs. Ltd. v. The Covance Campaign, No. D2004-0206 (WIPO Apr. 30, 2004), 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2004/d2004-0206.html)). 
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a different. They do not do, and are not intended to do, the same 
thing.”
re 
ndermines the very goal of commercial certainty . . . .”181 Since 
%
s as de facto precedents. To them, the choice of law provision 
ives
ing knowledge of the law, the panel 
nn
179 
 Beyond having different purposes, there is a worry about uniformity 
and certainty: using local laws “risks the UDRP fragmenting into a series 
of different systems, where the outcome to each case would depend 
upon where exactly the parties happened to reside. That way chaos 
lies.”180 Additionally, “bringing local law into the assessment of the Pol-
icy . . . u
64  of panels do not apply any law, this explanation might have pur-
chase. 
 Explaining panels’ decisions not to import law, though, has a 
shortcoming: virtually all of the fair use cases (96%) say nothing about 
the choice of law provision. And, we wouldn’t expect them to if most 
panels view the UDRP as self-referential. We would expect, as is the 
case, most panels to apply WIPO Rules or precedents from other cases. 
Put simply, panels do not think about this issue; they just use WIPO de-
cision
g  license to select among WIPO Rules or precedents, not national 
laws. 
 Additionally, in many cases the parties are from different countries 
than the panel. In cases involving Australian panels, for example, the 
panel and at least one party shared the same nationality only 20% of 
the time. Low numbers also exist for other panels deciding large num-
bers of cases, including the United Kingdom (50%), Canada (22%), 
and New Zealand (14%). In the cases where the panel and none of the 
parties share the same nationality, the panel likely does not know the 
law of the parties’ countries. Lack
ca ot apply it. This could explain why other panels do not apply for-
eign law as much as U.S. panels. 
 Still, there is another, related explanation for panels’ reluctance to 
import foreign law: most countries simply do not legislate cybersquat-
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). This statement is questionable, at least as 
to existing cybersquatting laws. The U.S. cybersquatting law, for example, is nearly identi-
main names that 
are istinctive or famous mark or is a protected 
trademark), with UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(a) (defining an applicable dispute as one in 
whic
cal to the UDRP. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006) (promoting cyberprivacy prevention 
by creating civil liability for a bad faith intent to profit from the use of do
“identical or confusingly similar” to a d
h the domain name is “identical or confusingly similar” to a trademark or service 
mark and it has been registered in “bad faith”). They are designed to do very similar, if not 
the exact same, things. The question is how each achieves the same goal. 
180 1066 Housing Ass’n, No. D2007-1461. 
181 Id. 
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ting. If no law exists to import, this would explain why non-U.S. panels 
have not applied it. In the sample of 148 cases, arbitrators, complain-
ants, and respondents represented thirty-four different countries.182 Of 
these thirty-four countries, only seven (20%)183 had legislation relating 
to domain names:184 the United States,185 Belgium,186 Finland,187 Ja-
pan,188 Russia,189 Spain,190 and Italy.191 Only some of these countries’ 
                                                                                                                      
182 In alphabetical order, those countries were Australia, Bahamas, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Ko-
rea, Norway, Panama, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States, and West Indies (Saint Kitts & Neviss). 
183 To find whether a country had national law relating to domain names, I used WIPO’s 
searchable database of national laws and treaties on intellectual property. WIPO Lex, World 
Int
ntain 
only “domain names.” I also consulted a text on Internet law. See generally Smith, supra note 
53. 
. 
w.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp? 
file_
. 
milar to a markholder or that otherwise cause injury to the 
mar
 Russia amended its trademark law to include protection for trademarks 
use
gistered trademark owner with the right to prohibit use of its mark 
 
ellectual Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). I 
searched each country individually, specifying that the “subject matter” field should co
Finally, I attempted to locate any online resource that indicated whether a country had 
legislation addressing domain names specifically. Sometimes this meant consulting the web-
sites of various countries (that list the country’s laws). For every country, I attempted to lo-
cate the official government website containing the text of all laws. When successful, I cited 
the source in the footnotes to this Article. 
184 “Relating to” does not mean that the country had specific cybersquatting laws akin 
to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006)
185 Id. 
186 Loi relative à l'enregistrement abusif des noms de domaine [Act on the Abusive 
Registration of Domain Names] of June 26, 2003, Moniteur Belge [M.B.] [Official Gazette 
of Belgium], Sept. 9, 2003, 45225, available at http://ww
id=187949; see Smith, supra note 53, at 206–09 (stating that the Act on the Abusive 
Registration of Domain Names created a cause of action for cybersquatting that applies 
only to “abusive registration of domain names by third parties who have no rights in the 
distinctive signs specified in the act,” but not to “freedom of speech disputes”). 
187 Finnish law includes the Domain Name Act, which applies only to the Finnish 
country-code top-level domain (ccTLD), “.fi.” Verkkotunnuslaki [Domain Name Act], 
translation available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030228.pdf; see 
also Smith, supra note 54, at 229–31 (describing the act)
188 Fusei kyousou boushihou [Unfair Competition Prevention Law], Law No. 47 of 
1993, art 2(xii) ( Japan), translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp? 
file_id=128372 (defining unfair competition to include “acquiring or holding” domain 
names that are confusingly si
kholder); id. art. 5(3)(iv) (providing a damages remedy for trademark holders whose 
rights have been infringed by a domain name); see also Brent T. Yonehara, landoftherising-
sun.co.jp: A Review of Japan’s Protection of Domain Names Against Cybersquatting, 43 IDEA 207, 
221–24 (2003) (describing Japan’s cybersquatting law). 
189 In 2002,
d in domain names. Mariyetta Meyers, Russia and the Internet: Russia’s Need to Confront 
and Conquer Trademark Infringement in Domain Names and Elsewhere on the Web, 9 Gonzaga J. 
Int’l L. 200, 213–16 (2006). 
190 Law 17/2001 of December 7, 2001, on Trademarks arts. 34(2), (3)(e) (B.O.E. 2001, 
23093) (Spain), translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id= 
126736 (providing a re
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legislation was directed at only cybersquatting. Two other countries— 
France and Norway—have laws addressing domain names. Both laws, 
however, became effective on a date outside that covered by my sam-
pled data.192 
 At first glance, that fact aligns with this explanation. With the U.S. 
being one of only four countries with cybersquatting laws, there just are 
not many laws to import.193 
                                                                                                                      
in a domain name in instances that meet Spanish infringement standards under art. 
34(2)(a)–(c)). 
191 See Decreto Legislativo 10 febbraio 2005, n. 273, in G.U. 4 marzo 2005, n. 52, art. 22 
(It.); see also Smith, supra note 54, at 257 (explaining that Article 22 of Italy’s Industrial 
Property Code “establishes that it is forbidden for an undertaking to use the sign or do-
mai
 
-
cting in good faith.” L. 45-2-2. A legitimate interest can include “a 
non
. Norway’s previous trademark law went into 
effe
ki, Customary Law of the Internet: In the 
Sea
n name of the trademark of another if the activities of the parties are either similar or 
dissimilar . . . so as to lead consumers to believe that there is a possible link between the 
two undertaking[s]”). 
192 France’s law, which applies only to “.fr,” “.re,” “.mq.,” “.yt,” and a few other top-level 
domain name (TLDs) (but not gTLDs) went into effect on August 4, 2011. Loi 2011-302 
du 22 mars 2011 [Law 2011-302 of March 22, 2011], Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 23, 2011, p. 5186, art. 19(v), avai-
lable at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=5008CEF4C7F4E 
F1FC34ADA73470C14BB.tpdjo04v_1?idArticle=LEGIARTI000023752116&cidTexte=LEG
ITEXT000023752099&dateTexte=20111116; Décret 2011-926 du 1 août 2011 relatif à la 
gestion des domaines de premier niveau de l'internet correspondant aux codes pays du 
territoire national [Decree 2011-926 of August 1, 2011 on the Management of Top-level 
Domains of the Internet Country Code Corresponding to the National Territory], Jour
nal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 
3, 2011, p. 13294, arts. R. 20-44-31 to R. 20-44-44, available at http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000024425287&dateTexte=&categorieLien= 
id. The legislative part of the Code was adopted as part of a March 22, 2011 law; govern-
ment norms were adopted on August 4, 2011. Thus, the operative date of all provisions is 
August 4, 2011. (Thanks to Cedric Manara for this information.) Specifically, these laws 
provide that a domain name can be withheld or deleted when it is “[l]ikely to infringe 
intellectual property rights or personality, unless the applicant provides proof of a legiti-
mate interest and is a
-commercial use of the domain name or a name related with no intention of mislead-
ing the consumers or harming the reputation of a name which is recognized or established 
a right.” R. 20-44-43. 
Norway’s law became effective on July 1, 2010. Lov om varemerker [The Trademarks 
Act], translation available at http://www.patentstyret.no/Global/Filarkiv/regelverk/Trade 
marks_Act_valid_01072010.pdf. The relevant language states: “The court may also decide 
on other action to prevent new trademark infringements, including that the infringing 
party shall take steps to delete or assign to the injured party any domain names used in 
contravention of the trademark right.” Id. § 59
ct on March 3, 1961. Id. § 83. I could not determine whether and when the 1961 law 
was amended. Because my study included WIPO decisions through September 2010, the 
French and Norwegian laws are not relevant. 
193 See also Przemyslaw Paul Polans
rch for a Supranational Cyberspace Law 322 (2007) (“With the exception of few 
countries such as the United States, no [specific, statutory] rights have been created for 
defending interests in a domain name.”). 
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 That explanation, however, is not totally convincing. Recall that the 
most frequently cited foreign law was Spain’s (cited three times). In the 
three other cases citing foreign law, the panel cited a European treaty,194 
EU law,195 and United Kingdom trademark law.196 None of the laws 
cited came from countries with cybersquatting statutes. In those cases, 
the panels cited trademark or unfair competition law, which tends to 
be—or at least is perceived as—less friendly to speech than U.S. trade-
mark law. That is not surprising considering that, even in countries that 
do not have specific cybersquatting statutes, courts have applied tradi-
arty’s home country.198 Without 
such knowledge, they can apply either their home country’s law or the 
UDRP. Nearly all elect th ly only what they know, 
tional trademark and unfair competition laws to resolve domain-name 
disputes.197 Thus, although most countries have law that could be ap-
plied to domain-name disputes, not many arbitrators apply it. 
 In light of this fact, panel nationality seems to best explain the lack 
of foreign law in the UDRP. Many foreign panels do not decide dis-
putes with any parties from their home country. For this reason, they 
likely do not know the law of either p
e latter course and app
or what they can make up as needed. 
                                                                                                                      
194 Moss & Coleman Solicitors v. Kordowski, No. D2006-1066 (WIPO Oct. 23, 2006), 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-1066.html (citing Arti-
cle 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the context of free speech). 
195 Espirito Santo Fin. Grp. S.A. v. Colman, No. D2001-1214 (WIPO Jan. 22, 2002), http:// 
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-1214.html (citing European 
Court of Justice case C-63/97, BMW v. Deenik, 1999 E.C.R. I-905, 1 C.M.L.R. 1099 (1999)). 
196 Lanware Ltd. v. Iveson, No. D2004-1061 (WIPO Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.wipo. 
int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2004/d2004-1061.html (citing U.K. law on passing-
off). 
197 Smith, supra note 53, at 200–04, 210–54, 258–97 (explaining how traditional 
trademark and unfair competition law have been applied in Australia, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland); Antonella Carminaati & Alexandre da Cuha Lyrio, 
Trademarks v. Domain Names—The Brazilian Experience, CBSG.com.br, http://www.cbsg.com. 
br/pdf_publicacoes/trademarksxdomain_names.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (describ-
ing various cases applying traditional legal principles, including trademarks and domain-
name disputes); Swiss Legal Practice (1999–2005), trademark.ch, http://www.trademark. 
ch/?sub_id=136&leng=1 (click the hyperlinked word “link” to obtain the abstracts of these 
decisions in German) (last updated Oct. 16, 2007) (listing cases involving domain names 
decided by Swiss courts). 
Additionally, many of these countries have UDRP-like procedures to settle cybersquat-
ting disputes involving domain names using their respective country’s ccTLD. In Australia, 
for example, the .au Dispute Resolution Policy (auDRP) provides more protection for 
trademark holders. Complaints can be brought for “business names or other names, not 
just trade marks and service marks.” Smith, supra note 53, at 202. 
198 Also, the complaints filed generally do not rely on local law. Therefore, the arbitra-
tors are not provided with the relevant provisions to interpret. 
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B. Reforming the UDRP 
 Some scholars state that “the most basic question about the bor-
dered Internet . . . is whether speech should be regulated globally or 
locally.”199 My study has shown that, in fair use UDRP cases, WIPO pan-
els have answered this “basic question” without addressing its normative 
component: in cases where the respondent is from the United States, 
panelists are more likely to apply U.S. law, or what they perceive to be 
U.S. law. In other words, U.S. panelists are more likely to apply local law 
when the dispute involves U.S. respondents. Yet, in cases where the re-
spondent is from any other country, the odds of a panel applying that 
country’s law are low. 
 Despite having inadvertently answered this
ism does not provide a structured way of think
 question, U.S. Favorit-
ing about which laws to 
fair use cases is problematic for 
seve hy, 
for e  the 
UDR
                                                                                                                     
apply—local, U.S., or international—in UDRP fair use disputes. 
1. Problems with the U.S. Law/UDRP Division 
 This U.S. law/UDRP division in 
ral reasons. First, it privileges U.S. law without justification.200 W
xample, should panels import U.S. law but not French law into
P? One arbitrator has remarked: 
There is something rather curious . . . [about the existence of 
a] US approach and a non-US approach . . . [to criticism web-
sites]. Laws protecting . . . freedom of speech are not unique 
 
199 Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 44, at 150. In addition, countless others have devoted 
their scholarship to this question. E.g., Matthew Burnstein, A Global Network in a Compart-
mentalised Legal Environment, in Internet: Which Court Decides? Which Law Applies? 
23, 24 (Boele-Woelki & Kessedjian eds., 1999); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and 
Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1370–76 (1996); Jonathan 
Zittrain, Be Careful What You Ask For: Reconciling a Global Internet and Local Law, in Who 
Rules the Net?: Internet Governance and Jurisdiction 13, 14 (Thierer & Crews eds., 
2003). 
200 One professor wonders whether we might justify this rule on the expectations of 
the parties: “If U.S. law is mainly privileged in disputes involving U.S. participants then, 
isn’t the justification arguably that the imposition of U.S. legal principles best meets the 
expectations of the parties? Is there anything wrong with this result in practice?” E-mail 
from Jacqueline D. Lipton, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, to 
David A. Simon, Summer Academic Fellow, Harvard Law Sch. (Apr. 11, 2011, 12:31 GMT) 
(on file with author). This explanation is problematic for two reasons. First, it is circular. It 
assumes the validity of an expectation that is based on a practice of privileging U.S. law. 
But that says nothing about whether a privilege is warranted in the first instance. Second, 
and relatedly, the expectation that U.S. law governs when U.S. parties resolve UDRP dis-
putes suggests that the opposite should hold true: that non-U.S. law would govern when 
other parties resolved UDRP disputes. But that simply has not happened. 
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to the United States. They exist in many countries and fre-
quently form part of those countries basic constitutional rules 
. . . . If local US law is to influence the issue in the United 
States, then logically, local laws not only can, but should, do so 
elsewhere in the world. And yet for the most part, panels in 
cause neither the UDRP nor WIPO take a 
es apply 
                                                                                                                     
other jurisdictions have not considered it necessary to take in-
to account their local laws in coming to their views on this 
particular issue.201 
This arbitrator questions whether there is a reason for importing only 
U.S. law.202 But even if panels had developed a rule or reason justifying 
this practice, the UDRP would not help us resolve whether we should 
accept the rule. This is be
stance on applicable law. The UDRP is completely silent on the subject. 
WIPO Rules, on the other hand, equivocate even on when the U.S.-
based rule should apply.203 
 This lack of clarity illustrates another reason why the U.S. 
law/UDRP division is problematic: arbitrators lack a principled way of 
deciding when, if ever, to apply law, WIPO rules, or simply use their 
own judgment. The data bear this out. Panels in fair use cas
U.S. law 30% of the time, foreign law 6% of the time, and no law (or sui 
generis rules) 64% of the time. Additionally, since WIPO published its 
Rules in 2005, panels have cited them in 32% of fair use cases. 
 This decisional freedom produces biased or inconsistent decisions. 
Inconsistent decisions threaten individuals’ and business’ ability to rely 
on the UDRP as a predictable form of dispute resolution. Such uncer-
tainty can have beneficial or deleterious consequences. On the one 
hand, applying narrow speech protections to domain names critical of 
a trademark holder can chill or skew speech. That result is orthogonal 
 
201 1066 Housing Ass’n, No. D2007-1461. Matthew Harris from the United Kingdom de-
cided this case as the sole panelist. Id. He also said: 
In short, the act of bringing local law into the assessment of the Policy when 
taken to its logical conclusion as a matter of practice undermines the very 
goal of commercial certainty identified in the Howard Jarvis case and with 
which this Panel whole heartedly agrees. There may be cases where it is inevi-
table, but in general it should be resisted. . . . [S]o far as the specific issue of 
rights and legitimate interest are concerned[,] the Panel sees no reason to 
import national rules and good reason not to do so. 
Id. 
202 Id. 
203 WIPO Rules, supra note 67, § 2.4 (stating that “[i]n cases involving only U.S. parties 
or the selection of a U.S. mutual jurisdiction, panelists tend to adopt the reasoning in [the 
U.S.-based rule] (though not universally)”). 
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to the purpose of the fair use provision: to provide a safety valve for 
speech. On the other hand, applying U.S. law to UDRP disputes involv-
g p
eously encouraging its suppression when it origi-
ate
cause of the U.S./non-U.S. dichot-
                                                                                                                     
in arties from speech-restrictive countries can increase the amount of 
speech online. The result, the data show, typically is related to respon-
dent and arbitrator nationality. 
 Finally, this U.S. law/UDRP division threatens to undermine the 
UDRP’s legitimacy—if not in the eyes of certain trademark holders, 
then at least in the eyes of non-trademark holders (i.e., Internet us-
ers).204 If the UDRP prides itself as representing international stan-
dards, it fails to do so by creating distinct rights for U.S. respondents 
and everyone else. On the one hand, this approach may benefit more 
speakers online, but only if they are from the United States. Other 
speech, regardless of what each country’s law has to say, will be pro-
vided less protection. On the other hand, this approach may encourage 
corporations and other large trademark holders to bring more UDRP 
actions when someone criticizes them online and is not from the Unit-
ed States. So, in the end, the UDRP would promote two contradictory 
positions based on a rather simplistic conception of both U.S. and non-
U.S. law: provide breathing space for speech originating in the United 
States while simultan
n s elsewhere. All this happens simply because of an oversimplified 
view of speech protections for trademark users in various countries 
around the world. 
 What exactly this will mean for the future of the UDRP is unclear. 
If UDRP decisions privilege United States law, other entities (e.g., gov-
ernments and corporations) may become disillusioned with its per-
ceived unfairness or applicability to disputes involving parties from 
their countries. If the entities that depend on the UDRP view it as un-
fair or inapt, they may opt out205 of the system or seek to change it. This 
policy may also alienate Internet users who expect certain speech pro-
tections, but do not receive them be
 
204 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 72, at 230 (“Panel decisions that diverge widely 
from the text of the UDRP, from each other, or from national laws, risk undermining the 
UDRP’s legitimacy.”). 
205 The UDRP, unlike other entrenched legal institutions, is optional in two basic 
senses. First, any party wishing to cancel or transfer domain names can do so in a court of 
law; using the UDRP is optional. Second, the UDRP provides a contract-based remedy. As 
such, it depends on the continued existence of the contract between ICANN and various 
registrars. ICANN—although heavily influenced by the United States—is responsive to 
concerns of various parties, particularly national governments. As countries become dissat-
isfied with the UDRP, they will opt-out of its procedures. Either they will sue in court, or, if 
court-based options become too expensive, they will work to change the UDRP. 
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omy. Perhaps none of this will happen immediately; but as disparities in 
eat
all, there is no principled reason to privilege U.S. law over 
the
applies under UDRP. The last option is substantive; it suggests 
e 
, prospec-
ve 
PO, the provider has recognized informal rules— 
ch
                                                                                                                     
tr ment between parties grow, and as more countries and users hop 
online, the chances only increase. 
2. Four Potential Reforms to the UDRP 
 Although the UDRP is not operating perfectly, we could leave it 
alone—which is what it appears ICANN will do. In this scenario, we 
would expect U.S. law to continue to dominate UDRP fair use cases, 
foreign law to be a nonfactor, and WIPO Rules to solidify the distinc-
tion between these Rules and U.S. law. That is one possible path, but, as 
noted above, there are costs for following it. For one, the current appli-
cation of the UDRP seems to undercut the policy’s international pur-
pose. After 
o r countries’ laws. That is, if U.S. law is privileged in cases where the 
parties are from the United States, other countries’ laws should be giv-
en similar deference when deciding disputes involving non-U.S. re-
spondents. 
 If we want a principled solution, four options exist. The first three 
options involve choice of law—they address U.S. Favoritism by altering 
what law 
on methodological approach panels could use to resolve certain kinds 
of domain-name disputes that involve free speech. This last substantive 
option could be used in conjunction with any of the three choice of law 
options. 
 First, ICANN could prohibit panels from referencing or applying 
any law. There are two problems with this approach. First, without refer-
ence to any law, the UDRP may become increasingly unpredictable. If 
panels simply apply ad hoc interpretations of UDRP provisions
ti domain-name holders cannot determine their ability to use a do-
main name ex ante. Second, divorcing the UDRP from national law 
would be impracticable. The UDRP depends upon a protectable trade-
mark interest, which is a legal right created by national law.206 
 Despite this risk of ex ante uncertainty, several facts ameliorate this 
concern. The UDRP already operates on a de facto precedent system. 
Most panels apply past decisions, not law. Moreover, at least in UDRP 
disputes before WI
su  as the Criticism Rule—that both respondents and complainants 
might rely on. There is no reason to suspect these practices would dis-
 
206 Thanks to Jacqueline Lipton for this point. 
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appear if we eliminated references to law. Indeed, it might actually en-
courage their use. 
 Even so, the mere fact that panels cite other decisions does not 
ensure that a desirable pattern will emerge—or, even if it does, that it 
will prevent panels from “changing” precedents for the worse. Indeed, 
although the UDRP may be de facto precedential, panels cite applica-
ble WIPO Rules in only 32% of all fair use cases. Additionally, a no-law 
system assumes that prohibiting the use of national law will successfully 
eliminate it from the UDRP. Disgorging law from the UDRP entirely, 
however, is impracticable. Arbitrators’ worldviews—their conceptions of 
fairness and justice—drive their conclusions. Shaping these worldviews 
are the culture and laws of the countries in which they reside. Thus, we 
cannot totally separate particular countries’ legal norms from entering 
ll participating countries. Countries have dif-
ren
w panels are selected. Should 
                                                                                                                     
UDRP decisions. We should expect “uniform” UDRP to reflect arbitra-
tors’ different worldviews and, therefore, the law of their home coun-
tries. Minimizing this effect would require a more substantive revision 
of UDRP provisions. 
 A no-law provision is not the only solution. ICANN also could take 
the opposite approach and implement a formal choice of law provision. 
ICANN would have to articulate a procedure for selecting a particular 
country’s law. Requiring panels to import their countries’ laws would 
balance the interests of a
fe t conceptions of free speech and different trademark laws.207 A 
provision that accounts for these differences treats each country’s law 
equally. Additionally, it provides some measure of predictability and 
legitimacy to the UDRP. 
 Like other approaches, this one is not impermeable to criticism. 
One problem relates to whose law applies. The law of the panel’s home 
country? The respondent’s? The complainant’s? Some combination? 
Picking one of these options just raises more questions. Why should the 
law of the respondent’s home country apply, for example, when a do-
main name can cause “harm” to the trademark owner anywhere in the 
world? The other problem relates to ho
 
207 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain 
Name System, 21 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 495, 511 (2000). 
[There are a] wide range of free speech notions that exist around the world 
once we move beyond [certain] core principles. And the UDRP system does 
not presently require us to venture into the murky waters of enforcement be-
cause the remedies (transfer of domain name) are limited to those that can 
be effectuated by the registrars without the aid of national courts. 
Id. 
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p ls of particular nationality hear certain disputes? The answer to 
this question likely will depend on whose law governs. In cases where a 
panel must apply Finnish law, for example, it would make sense for a 
Finnish arbitrator to hear the dispute. 
 Third, ICANN could require all panels to apply only U.S. law to all 
UDRP disputes. The advantages and drawbacks of this approach are 
straightforward. For respondents, this approach w
ane
ould increase their 
bili
Complainants win 80% of the 
S. law—to decide disputes undermines the interna-
on
 The last reform is one that focuses on remedies, rather than choice 
of law. Currently the UDRP gives panels who find for the complainant 
                                                                                                                     
a ty to use trademarks in their domain names. It also would increase 
clarity in UDRP fair use cases and, because the U.S. has a cybersquat-
ting law (the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, or the “AC-
PA”),208 presumably in other types of cases as well. 
 But the drawbacks are substantial. Complainants would oppose the 
change because it produces less favorable outcomes for them. Cur-
rently, complainants enjoy an 83% win rate in fair use cases in which 
the respondent is not from the United States.209 When the respondent 
is from the United States, however, the complainant’s win rate drops 
18%, to 65%.210 We see the same trend when we examine arbitrator—
as opposed to respondent—nationality. 
time when a non-U.S. panel resolves the dispute.211 But that percentage 
falls by 15%, to 65%, when a U.S. panel resolves the dispute.212 Because 
it seems that U.S. law partially explains this phenomenon, using only 
U.S. law would likely favor respondents. 
 Furthermore, the proposal would alienate other countries. If only 
U.S. law applied, the UDRP would become a “mini” U.S. tribunal. But 
ICANN did not adopt the UDRP so panels could apply U.S. law to all 
domain-name disputes. The purpose of the UDRP is to provide an in-
ternational dispute-resolution process. Using only U.S. law—or worse, 
perceptions of U.
ti al application of the UDRP. Indeed, arbitrators from other coun-
tries would be unnecessary; only U.S. panels would be required to apply 
U.S. law. For these reasons, the U.S. law approach would likely meet 
strong resistance. 
 
006). 
pra Figures 2, 3. 
208 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2
209 See supra Figure 2. 
210 See supra Figure 2 
211 See supra Figure 3. 
212 See su
2012] An Empirical Analysis of Fair Use Decisions 113 
the power to cancel or transfer the respondent’s domain name.213 Un-
der this proposal, however, the UDRP would limit the complainant’s 
m
ystem—the principal difference 
re edy to only cancellation when the website implicates free speech 
interests.” 
 This new proposal has two benefits. First, it is flexible. We can inte-
grate this approach with any of the aforementioned approaches. Second, 
it protects speech space rather than individual defendants per se. By pre-
venting complainants from controlling unused “free speech domains,” 
this option preserves that space for people to express themselves. Take, for 
example, the domain name <http://livingspacessucks.com>214 that re-
solves to a website that states in large print, “This website is for sale!” 
Underneath this, further text reads, “The future blog for consumers to 
voice their frustrations with Living Spaces!” The website seems to be de-
signed solely for resale, albeit to gripers. The noncommercial fair use 
defense does not seem to apply to this respondent. It could, however, ap-
ply to a subsequent griper. Yet, the complainant who succeeds in a cy-
bersquatting claim under the UDRP can request that the panel transfer 
the domain name to it. That transfer, however, essentially closes off space 
for free speech: the opportunity to use the domain name for a critical, 
creative, or informational message is no longer available. A remedy that 
allows for cancellation but not transfer preserves the space in which free 
speech can be made. Thus, the cancellation-only policy would operate 
much like the current domain-name s
would be that sites invoking speech interests would not automatically be 
transferred to successful complainants. 
 Because the current UDRP is designed for a first-come, first-served 
domain-name registration system, this proposal seems to face difficul-
ties.215 In particular, a cancellation-only remedy leaves the domain 
name open to further abusive registrations. We have, in other words, 
the “whack-a-mole” problem: shut down one cybersquatter and another 
                                                                                                                      
213 UDRP, supra note 5, § 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to 
any proceeding before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancella-
tion of your domain name or the transfer of your domain name registration to the com-
plainant.”). 
214 The website “www.livingspacessucks.com” was taken down after a UDRP complaint 
was filed. Easy Win for Living Spaces UDRP?, domainmonster.com ( July 27, 2011), http:// 
www.domainmonster.com/editorials/easy-udrp-win/; see also Case Details for WIPO Case D2011-
1262, World Intellectual Prop. Org., http://www.oapi.wipo.net/amc/en/domains/ 
search/case.jsp?case_id=21376 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
215 Repeat cybersquatters will be less of a problem under the new gTLD registration 
system, which allows registration of gTLDs by only “[e]stablished corporations, organiza-
tions, or institutions” and requires a review and objection process. See gTLD Applicant 
Guidebook, supra note 87, § 1.2.1. 
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one registers the identical domain again. But characteristics of poten-
tial cybersquatters may actually mitigate, rather than increase, this risk. 
We might, for example, expect prospective cybersquatters to know 
demark 
wn
ey seem to be in a bet-
r p
hatever the precise solution, the purpose of this Article is not to 
op
comings.218 Doing nothing is easy, but it risks delegitimizing the UDRP 
something about domain names, domain-name registration, and do-
main-name cancellation or transfer under the UDRP.216 Thus, cancella-
tions of domain names like <[trademark]sucks.com> should deter 
future abusive registrations, not encourage them. 
 How much a cancellation-only remedy deters potential cybersquat-
ters depends on the aggressiveness and reputation of the trademark 
owner. The more valuable the mark’s reputation, the more likely the 
mark owner will pursue a UDRP action. Likewise, wealthy tra
o ers are more likely to pursue UDRP action than moderately-
endowed ones. Thus, a cancellation-only remedy may increase trade-
mark owners’ need to police their marks. Nevertheless, they likely will 
continue to do so for the same reasons they have in the past.217 
 That is not to say the costs to mark owners will be insignificant in 
all cases. The whack-a-mole problem, however, may be a cost public pol-
icy demands the trademark holder to bear. Trademark owners, after all, 
are filing UDRP complaints in any case—and th
te osition than the registrar to monitor the use of their marks. If the 
costs to trademark owners are too high, there are other available op-
tions. Some kind of burden-shifting approach, for example, might be 
workable in cases of repeat, abusive registrants. 
 W
pr ose it; it is to point out two facts. First, a cancellation-only remedy 
for certain cases better protects speech-interests than a transfer. Sec-
ond, while this approach faces difficulties, solutions exist to deal with 
them. 
 All of the aforementioned approaches have benefits and short-
                                                                                                                      
216 It is not unreasonable to assume that potential cybersquatters have been subject to 
UD
way are not able to purchase the domain names for a large sum. Thus, the 
mar
ses are decided by only one arbitra-
 
RP action in the past—or, if not, that they at least know something about their poten-
tial liability under the policy. 
217 It may turn out, though, that trademark owners decide that policing these speech 
spaces under a cancel-only policy is too costly. If that happens, we might worry about 
speech space being clogged by cybersquatters. Assuaging that fear, however, should be the 
fact that most individuals who use domain names incorporating trademarks in a noncom-
mercial, fair 
ket price for these domain names should be only marginally higher than the cost of 
registration. 
218 One might wonder why parties worried about U.S. Favoritism simply do not select 
non-U.S. arbitrators. One reason is that most fair use ca
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and creating a further divide between U.S. and other countries. Apply-
ing U.S. law has the same—but probably stronger—effects. Excluding 
law from UDRP decisions altogether may engender new rules, but 
these rules are likely to reflect the law and customs of the panel’s home 
country. A meaningful choice of law provision would balance nations’ 
 U.S. respondents. 
not arguing about how to govern the Internet with law or some other me-
chanism. That topic has been debated feverishly.219 It is, however, argu-
interests, but doing so simply and effectively seems difficult. Given 
these problems, which approach is best in fair use cases? 
3. ICANN Should Revise the UDRP to Apply Local Law to UDRP Cases 
 At least in fair use cases, ICANN should revise and clarify both the 
panel assignment process and the UDRP’s choice of law provision. The 
new choice of law provision should specify that a panel apply the law of 
the respondent’s home country. The new panel assignment procedure 
should require that arbitrators share the same nationality as the re-
spondent. In practice, this would not greatly affect
WIPO’s de facto policy assigns U.S. panels to U.S. respondents. But for 
other respondents, WIPO’s assignment pattern is not clear. It is in this 
realm that the policy would have the greatest effect. 
 Although this proposal requires adopting two separate provisions, 
the proposed choice of law rule and panel assignment procedure are 
tied together. Indeed, to understand the proposal, one must under-
stand the relationship between these two mechanisms. This Section 
starts by discussing panel selection and then discusses applicable law. 
Before entering this discussion, it must be made clear that this Article is 
                                                                                                                      
tor. In any case, that does not solve the problem of the U.S./non-U.S. dichotomy. It merely 
allows parties to choose between two existing options. 
219 See generally James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-
wired Censors, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 177 (1997) (arguing that technological solutions offer a 
way for the state to exert legal power over the internet); Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyber-
space, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1095 (1996) (arguing that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause are constitutional limitations on indi-
vidual states' ability to regulate internet activity); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 
65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998) (arguing that internet regulation is at least “feasible and 
legitimate from the perspective of jurisdiction and choice of law”); Johnson & Post, supra 
note 199 (suggesting that regulating cyberspace will require modifying our understanding 
of law and its connection to physical boundaries); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks 
and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L.J. 911 (1996) (suggesting that, in the context of 
the global information infrastructure, “a new ‘network governance paradigm’ must 
emerge to recognize the complexity of regulatory power centers . . . and shift the role of 
the state toward the creation of an incentive structure for network self-regulation”). 
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ing that the UDRP should incorporate local law in fair use disputes.220 
More specifically, this Article proposes a regime that is appropriate giv-
en my study of fair use cases at WIPO. Therefore, the proposal applies 
only to fair use cases. Although this proposal could apply to the UDRP 
generally, scholars should study the other provisions more broadly be-
re
ld occur, and providers have not been forth-
the panel had absolutely no connection to the 
ris
                                                                                                                     
fo  making changes wholesale.221 
 Panel selection and assignment under the UDRP has only a few 
rules. As noted previously,222 the complainant and respondent can of-
fer lists of arbitrators in cases where a three-member panel decides the 
dispute. The provider assigns two arbitrators from the lists submitted by 
the parties—one from each party. It then assigns one arbitrator on its 
own. In a one-member panel, the provider assigns the arbitrator. How 
providers assign specific arbitrators is unknown. The UDRP does not 
state how this does or shou
coming with information. 
 The data, however, show two patterns of assignment in fair use dis-
putes: one for U.S. panels and one for other panels. U.S. panels almost 
always decide cases with at least one U.S. party. Indeed, in 88% of all 
fair use disputes decided by U.S. panels, at least one party was from the 
United States.223 That means that in 12% of all fair use disputes de-
cided by U.S. panels, 
ju diction of either party.224 
 For fair use cases decided by other panels, this problem is particu-
larly acute.225 Of all the cases decided by Australian panels, for exam-
 
220 Other scholars have suggested different reforms to the UDRP. One scholar, for ex-
w. See generally Laur-
enc
ation—
app anging the panel assignment policy 
nee . But, even if it is, there may be other ways around making 
the  screening mechanism prior to panel assignment, for example, 
cou
many, respon-
dent was from the United States, and the sole panelist was from the United Kingdom); 
 
ample, has suggested that the UDRP can take one of three approaches: apply U.S. legal 
principles, apply the laws of all countries, or apply UDRP sui generis la
e R. Helfer, Whither the UDRP: Autonomous, Americanized, or Cosmopolitan?, 12 Cardozo J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 493, 494 (2004). Others have argued for a wholesale reworking of the 
UDRP to be more speech protective. E.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democ-
ratic Norms, and Internet Governance, 52 Emory L.J. 187, 190–91 (2003). 
221 Because this proposal applies only to fair use cases, it faces one major, but not in-
surmountable, difficulty. Namely, it requires changing the panel assignment provision for 
all disputes, even though the findings—and subsequent choice of law recommend
ly only to fair use disputes. As I argue below, ch
d not be viewed negatively
wholesale change. Some
ld be used to determine whether the dispute substantively involved fair use. 
222 See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra Figure 12. 
224 See supra Figure 12. 
225 E.g., Native Instruments GmbH v. Williams, No. D2007-0973 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2007), 
http://www.udrpsearch.com/wipo/d2007-0973 (complainant was from Ger
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ple, 80% did not involve any party from Australia.226 The numbers are 
similar for other countries. For all fair use cases involving panels from 
the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand, the percent of cases 
in which neither party was from those countries was 50%, 78%, and 
86%, respectively.227 Thus, many non-U.S. panels decide cases involving 
parties from countries other than their own. Unlike the assignment 
atte
el as-
gnm
lies in fair use cases. As I stated at the beginning of 
is 
p rn for U.S. arbitrators, no clear assignment pattern exists for non-
U.S. arbitrators.228 
 Normally, random assignment of arbitrators is a virtue. Not here. 
The reason is because panel assignment and choice of law are closely 
connected. What law panels apply depends on who comprises those pa-
nels. Recall that without a principled basis for applying laws, UDRP pan-
els will continue to apply national laws or WIPO Rules—or make ad hoc 
decisions—at varying rates. Given the data, we would expect that, in fair 
use cases, U.S. panels would continue to apply U.S. law more than other 
panels apply foreign law. But, for other panels, what principles or law 
they will apply is uncertain. Part of this uncertainty is tied to pan
si ent. If a panel has no national connection to either party, its deci-
sion is more likely to be ad hoc, unprincipled, and unpredictable. 
 To eliminate this risk, ICANN should clarify and explain how pro-
viders should assign panels. Specifically, panel assignment should be 
tied to what law app
th Section, panels should apply the law of a respondent’s home coun-
try in fair use cases. 
 To facilitate these choice of law rules and procedures, panels must 
have some knowledge of the law they apply. Thus, I propose that the 
provider assign to cases arbitrators that share the same nationality as 
the respondent. In the case of three-member panels, this means two 
arbitrators should be from the same country as the respondent; the 
third should be from the complainant’s country.229 Providing two pan-
                                                                                                                      
Pfizer Inc. v. Zhan, No. D2006-1134 (WIPO Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.wipo.int/amc/ 
en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-1134.html (complainant was from the United 
Stat  Canada, and the sole panelist was from China). 
s not seem likely. The more likely explanation is 
that
es where neither party elects to choose arbitrators, the provider could 
 
es, respondent was from
226 See supra Figure 12. 
227 See supra Figure 12. 
228 It may be that there just have not been enough cases for a pattern to develop. Al-
though plausible, that explanation doe
 panel assignment does not matter much, at least as concerns fair use, in cases where 
neither party is from the United States. 
229 There are different ways to implement this proposal. One method would allow each 
party to choose a home country panelist when either party elects a three-member panel. 
The provider would then choose the third panelist, who would hail from the respondent’s 
home country. In cas
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elists from the respondent’s country ensures that the law is applied ac-
curately. Retaining at least one party from the complainant’s country 
low
e UDRP Rules, the provider appoints a one-
n comes to mind: eliminate one-member pa-
al s for a flexible system. Because the complainant’s fair use law may 
govern in some cases, it is important for the panel to be knowledgeable 
of the complainant’s home-country law. 
 What happens, though, when the complainant’s law governs in a 
one-member panel? When the respondent default, there is no choice 
of law problem. Under th
member panel after it receives the respondent’s response.230 Thus, if 
the respondent defaults, the provider can assign a panelist from the 
complainant’s home country. 
 But a problem arises in cases where the respondent answers and 
the complainant contests the respondent’s purported location. The 
arbitrator in such a case would hail from the respondent’s home coun-
try. So that arbitrator likely would not have working knowledge of the 
complainant’s home-country law. Under the proposed burden-shifting 
approach (discussed below), however, the complainant’s law could gov-
ern. Thus, the panelist deciding the case could be ignorant of the 
complainant’s law. Although this problem could be addressed in many 
different ways, one solutio
nels altogether. In addition to facilitating the proposed choice of law 
rule, using only three-member panels probably would promote fairer 
resolutions all around.231 
 Even if we accept these panel assignment rules, we would still need 
to know what constitutes “a respondent’s home country.” This term 
should mean “country listed as the registrant’s in the WHOIS data-
base.” The WHOIS database is a publicly available, searchable database 
that contains the contact information of domain-name registrants.232 
When an individual or corporation registers a domain name, the in-
formation they provide automatically enters the WHOIS database.233 If 
                                                                                                                      
assign panelists—two from the respondent’s home country and one from the complain-
ant’s home country. 
230 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 6(b). 
231 See Geist, supra note 23, at 930–33. 
232 Mueller, supra note 45, at 235 (“The WHOIS database allows one to type in a do-
main name and pull up the name and address of the individual or company that registered 
the domain.”); What Is WHOIS?, Network Solutions, http://www.networksolutions.com/ 
whois/index.jsp (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (“Once your listing appears in this online di-
rectory, it is publicly available to anyone who chooses to check domain names using the 
WHOIS search tool.”). 
233 What Is WHOIS?, supra note 232 (“When you register a domain name, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) requires your domain name 
registrar to submit your personal contact information to the WHOIS database.”). 
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I registered <www.stevejobslikesapples.com>, for example, I would 
have to enter my name and contact information. Because I reside in 
e U
                                                                                                                     
th nited States, I would enter that as my home country. If Apple filed 
a complaint with WIPO, a U.S. panel would hear the dispute. In mak-
ing a decision, the panel would apply U.S. law to interpret or “fill the 
gaps” in the (fair use portion of the) UDRP. 
 Because a domain-name registrant enters information into the 
WHOIS database, one might question the reliability of the information. 
Hence, there is some risk that the registrant will provide incorrect, mis-
leading, or false information. Although current ICANN agreements 
address this risk, their effectiveness is uncertain.234 The new choice of 
law provision should address this risk in two ways. First, it should re-
quire any complainant who asserts that the respondent does not reside 
 
234 ICANN’s Accreditation Agreement requires registrars to obtain—and domain-name 
registrants to provide—accurate contact information. Registrar Accreditation Agreement , 
§ 3.7.7.1, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos. (May 21, 2009), www.icann.org/en 
/regis-trars/ra-agreement-21may09-en.htm. 
The Registered Name Holder shall provide to Registrar accurate and reliable 
contact details and promptly correct and update them during the term of the 
Registered Name registration, including: the full name, postal address, e-mail 
address, voice telephone number, and fax number if available of the Regis-
tered Name Holder; name of authorized person for contact purposes in the 
case of an Registered Name Holder that is an organization, association, or 
corporation; and the data elements listed in Subsections 3.3.1.2, 3.3.1.7 and 
3.3.1.8. 
Id. It also requires registrars to verify, and re-verify, this information for accuracy. If anyone 
notifies the registrar of an inaccuracy, the registrar has a duty to investigate. Id. § 3.7.8. 
Registrar shall, upon notification by any person of an inaccuracy in the con-
tact information associated with a Registered Name sponsored by Registrar, 
take reasonable steps to investigate that claimed inaccuracy. In the event Reg-
istrar learns of inaccurate contact information associated with a Registered 
Name it sponsors, it shall take reasonable steps to correct that inaccuracy. 
Id. The registrar may cancel the domain names of registrants who supply inaccurate con-
tact information to the Registrar. Id. § 3.7.7.2. 
A Registered Name Holder’s willful provision of inaccurate or unreliable in-
formation, its willful failure promptly to update information provided to Reg-
istrar, or its failure to respond for over fifteen calendar days to inquiries by 
Registrar concerning the accuracy of contact details associated with the Regis-
tered Name Holder’s registration shall constitute a material breach of the 
Registered Name Holder-registrar contract and be a basis for cancellation of 
the Registered Name registration. 
Id. Domain-name registrants can be held liable for uses of their domain names by third 
parties, licensed or unlicensed. Id. § 3.7.7.3 (requiring a licensor of a domain name to 
keep current contact records and to accept liability for any use by the licensee). 
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in the home country to provide evidence of that fact. Evidence must 
consist of more than mere assertions. If the complainant can produce 
such evidence, the burden shifts to the respondent, who will have to 
provide evidence rebutting the presumption. If, on the other hand, the 
respondent cannot meet the burden, the complainant’s law applies. 
Second, in the cases of respondent default, the panel will presume that 
th respondent does not reside in the country listed in the WHOIS da-
tabase, and the complainant’s law will govern. Using either the law of 
the complainant’s or the respondent’s home country allows providers 
to appoint panels with knowledge of any potentially applicable law. 
 Despite this burden-shifting approach, some may worry that cor-
porate registrants may try to “game” the system by registering corpora-
tions in countries with speech-friendly domain-name laws. While this 
risk exists, at least three factors ameliorate it. First, the fair use defense 
covers noncommercial fair uses. This excludes uses designed merely to 
profit off the goodwill in a trademark. For these reasons, corporations 
are not likely to (successfully) game the choice of law provision. Sec-
ond, companies seeking to protect their trademarks will be enforcing 
their marks; they will be the complainants. Because the law of the respon-
dent’s home governs, where the complainant resides is important only in 
cases of respondent default. Third, it costs time and money to set-up 
and operate a corporation in a country. Costs will diminish the risk that 
companies will try to regi
e 
ster companies in domain-friendly countries 
is, forcing the complainant to gather in-
form cy 
of th r 
the ch 
of th
bers) known to Complainant re-
garding how to contact Respondent or any representative of 
Respondent, including contact information based on pre-
     
merely to trade off the goodwill of others’ trademarks. Under the new 
UDRP provision, a company will not be able to circumvent the resi-
dence requirement by merely registering a corporation; it must operate 
in that country as well.235 
 At this point, one might be concerned that the burden on the 
complainant is too high. That 
ation about the respondent’s whereabouts reduces the efficien
e UDRP. But, that ignores the complainant’s current duties unde
UDRP. A complaint under the current UDRP must provide mu
is information, including 
the name of the Respondent (domain-name holder) and all 
information (including any postal and e-mail addresses and 
telephone and telefax num
                                                                                                                 
e defined either by local law or by the UDRP. 235 What constitutes “operating” could b
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complaint dealings, in sufficient detail to allow the Provider to 
send the complaint . . . .236 
One may read the language “known to Complainant” to absolve the 
complainant of any duty to investigate facts. But such a reading would 
not make sense. Most of the time, complainants will know little, if any-
thing, about the domain-name owner. At the very least, the complainant 
must take reasonable steps to gain such information, such as by using 
the WHOIS database. Since the information in the WHOIS database 
t 
. U
                                                                                                                     
would govern the choice of law issue, this new requirement would no
be a burden. 
4 sing Local Law Addresses Concerns of Speech, Uniformity, Cost, 
and Predictability 
 There are further concerns with this system. Four are particularly 
relevant: speech, uniformity, cost, and predictability. Although using 
local law is promising, it raises free speech concerns. Some countries’ 
trademark and cybersquatting laws are not speech-protective. Some 
commentators worry that oppressive regimes will use the trademark 
law—and thus the UDRP—as cover to censor unpopular viewpoints or 
speech. Although this risk exists, it is not as serious as it appears. Most 
oppressive governments wishing to suppress speech do so using direct 
government action, not trademark or cybersquatting laws. The Chinese 
government, for example, censors speech by blocking websites di-
ectly 237r .  Thus, UDRP disputes are not typically the subject of speech 
disputes in authoritarian countries about which we normally would be 
concerned. 
 Nevertheless, a risk of private censorship exists in countries with 
speech-restrictive laws. In these countries, trademark owners will be 
able to suppress speech that infringes their trademarks, even if another 
country would decide the dispute differently. This risk, though, is one 
that traditional trademark law readily accepts. Each country’s trade-
mark laws generally do not apply outside its borders. It is reasonable to 
expect individuals of various countries to bear that same risk when us-
g ain  trademark in a domain name. Thus, using the law of the respon-
dent’s home country to resolve UDRP disputes is in line with tradi-
tional territoriality principles. 
 
236 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 3(b)(v). 
237 See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in 
China, Harvard Law Sch., http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/ (last updated 
Mar. 20, 2003). 
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 Using local laws, though, decreases the overall uniformity of the 
UDRP. Indeed, we saw in Section IV.A that at least one panel fears that 
applying local laws would disturb the uniformity of the UDRP.238 That 
fear, however, seems overstated. Currently, various splits already occur 
within the WIPO Rules.239 Furthermore, many decisions (68%),240 do 
not cite WIPO Rules at all. Although importing national law may frac-
ture the UDRP, maintaining the current U.S. law/UDRP dichotomy 
trades one large fracture line for a more nuanced and controlled ap-
proach. The U.S. law/UDRP dichotomy, for example, sacrifices the ter-
ritoriality that defines all other trademark law. Instead, it opts to favor 
U.S. parties, leaving others under less-friendly interpretations of the fair 
use defense, even in cases where their home country’s law (like Ger-
many’s) may allow such a use.241 Additionally, it ignores the fact that 
the parties can file lawsuits in various countries even after a UDRP reso-
lution. Put another way, parties can pursue their legal options under the 
laws of other countries.242 If the UDRP purports to be a system founded 
on common international principles, it makes little sense to disregard 
those legal principles that would govern in its absence. Moreover, there 
always exists the possibility of an increasingly unpredictable UDRP. Al-
though the U.S. law/UDRP dichotomy exists now, further breaks could 
develop on unforeseen grounds. Although this risk currently appears 
w, 
ns, which may not be in the 
                                                                                                                     
lo it would, if realized, increase ex ante costs for both (potential) 
complainants and respondents. 
 Finally, the objection also assumes that the costs of using local laws 
would be much higher than a self-referential system. That assumption 
does not hold. Under a policy that uses local law to settle disputes, the 
respondent would have at least as much notice as under the UDRP. In-
stead of combing through WIPO decisio
native language of the party, the parties can consult the binding legal 
precedents of the applicable jurisdiction. 
 
238 See supra notes 136–198 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 146–157 and accompanying text. 
240 The 68% includes only decisions after WIPO published its Rules in 2005. 
241 See supra notes 159–198 and accompanying text. 
242 Taking account of local laws also recognizes the realities of the political economy. If 
the UDRP does not reflect the laws of specific countries, the usefulness of the UDRP di-
minishes, at least in particular countries. In the United States, for example, the ACPA re-
flects principles embodied in the UDRP; thus, the UDRP should be a strong predictor of 
outcomes under the ACPA. But, if the UDRP does not reflect U.S.-ACPA law, the UDRP 
risks becoming disconnected from the ACPA, at least when applied to U.S. parties. How 
this would affect the use of U.S. courts and the state of U.S. law is uncertain. At the very 
least, it would change the current incentive structure for filing UDRP complaints. Similar 
concerns exist for countries that have specific cybersquatting laws. 
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 For a similar reason, a UDRP that imported local law could reduce 
social costs by specifying what law applies and who applies it. As one 
scholar has noted: “the differences between the trademark and do-
main-name systems lead to these (and other) social costs ex post; if 
these are costs that can be reduced by one system having regard to the 
other ex ante, then some coordination is clearly worthwhile.”243 A sys-
tem defined by reference to specific laws is also better equipped to ad-
dress noneconomic trademark law concerns, such as free speech.244 
tio
                                                                                                                     
This is important because “different countries deal with the collision 
[between trademark law and free speech] in different ways . . . .”245 
 What if, however, a country has no specific domain-name law? Of 
the thirty-four countries in my study, for example, only seven countries 
in my sample have laws that discuss domain names: the United States, 
Belgium, Finland, Japan, Russia, Spain, Italy, and, very recently, France 
and Norway.246 Only a few of these laws deal explicitly with cybersquat-
ting. How could panels apply the laws of their home country when 
none existed? That question erroneously assumes that having no cyber-
squatting law is the same as having no law at all. Although many coun-
tries do not have cybersquatting laws, they do have laws regarding 
speech and trademarks. These laws can be applied in the context of 
UDRP disputes involving fair use. Prior to the enactment of the ACPA, 
for example, U.S. courts ably applied free speech and trademark prin-
ciples to domain-name disputes.247 Indeed, they still do—the ACPA is 
an alternative to traditional trademark infringement (and dilution) 
ac ns.248 There is no reason to suspect other countries’ courts or arbi-
trators would be less capable. Some countries already have done this.249 
 Alternatively, panels could incorporate existing country-specific, 
domain-name resolution policies. Many countries have UDRP-like poli-
 
243 Dinwoodie, supra note 207, at 505–06. 
244 Id. at 511 (stating that “trademark protection, especially for words, collides with 
free speech concerns”). 
245 Id. 
246 See supra notes 184–191 and accompanying text. 
247 Courts in the United States—prior to Congress enacting a domain-name-specific 
law (the ACPA)—used traditional trademark principles to resolve domain-name disputes. 
See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 
1999) (applying traditional trademark law principles to a dispute involving domain 
names); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324–27 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to a cybersquatting dispute). 
248 E.g., Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 431 
(4th Cir. 2011) (dealing with a plaintiff who alleged a violation of the ACPA in addition to 
trademark law). 
249 See supra note 196. 
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cies that pertain to domain names containing the country’s “code” — 
like “.us” for the United States—known as a “country-code top-level 
domain” (ccTLD). Perhaps unsurprisingly, WIPO helped shape each of 
these agreements.250 These agreements, like the UDRP, are contractual. 
When one wants to register a domain name with ccTLD, one must do 
so through a registrar in that country.251 Many registries have UDRP-
ke 
registrants to agree to resolve 
                                                                                                                     
li agreements that the registrant must agree to when registering a 
domain name.252 
 To obtain a ccTLD for Canada (.ca), for example, one must regis-
ter with the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA).253 Like 
ICANN, CIRA binds registrants through a mandatory “Registrant 
Agreement.”254 This agreement requires 
disputes255 using the CIRA Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(CDRP), which is similar to the UDRP.256 
 Although different countries’ agreements have different provi-
sions, they closely resemble the UDRP. The CDRP, for example, pro-
vides a list of what constitutes “legitimate interests.”257 One of these in-
 
250 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Country Code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs), 
World Intellectual Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/cctld/ (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2011) (“WIPO has provided advice to many ccTLDs with a view to estab-
lishing registration conditions and dispute resolution procedures that conform with inter-
national standards of intellectual property protection while taking into account the par-
ticular circumstances and needs of the individual ccTLD.”). 
251 Smith, supra note 53, at 153. 
A wide variety of organizations, some state, some private, have responsibility 
delegated by IANA [(The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority)] for manag-
ing country code domains . . . . Each ccTLD is able to organize and sub-divide 
its own domain space as it wishes within the general policy laid down by IANA 
. . . . Each ccTLD tends to have its own local requirements for registration 
. . . . 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
252 See Arbitration and Mediation Center, ccTLD Database, World Intellectual Prop. 
Org., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/cctld_db/codes/ar.html (last updated Oct. 
24, 2011) (displaying a searchable database of “ccTLD registration agreements, WHOIS 
services, and alternative dispute resolution procedures”). 
253 FAQ, Canadian Internet Registration Auth., http://www.cira.ca/why-ca/faq/ 
(click through “What is a registry”) (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (“CIRA is the registry for the 
.CA domain.”). 
254 Registrant Agreement, Version 2.0, Oct. 12, 2010, GoDaddy.com, https://www.godaddy. 
com/domains/popups/caagreement.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
255 Id. 
256See CIRA Policies, Rules, and Procedure: CIRA Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Version 
1.2, Canadian Internet Registration Auth., http://www.cira.ca/assets/Documents/CDRP 
policy.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
257 Id. § 3.6. 
2012] An Empirical Analysis of Fair Use Decisions 125 
cludes using the domain name “in good faith in association with a non-
commercial activity including, without limitation, criticism, review or 
news reporting . . . .”258 The fair use provision of the “.au” Dispute 
eso
to ad-
res
tes more informed and nu-
                                                                                                                     
R lution Procedure (auDRP), which resolves disputes involving Aus-
tralia’s ccTLD, is identical to the UDRP.259 
 Although using ccTLD dispute resolution procedures has promise, 
there are two problems. First, most of these policies do not differ from 
the UDRP. Thus, they do not provide much substantive guidance. This 
likely reflects WIPO’s role in helping registrars craft dispute resolution 
policies.260 Second, even if the UDRP did use specific ccTLD policies to 
resolve domain-name disputes, it probably would not reflect the legal 
differences in each country. The reason is because WIPO already de-
cides many ccTLD disputes.261 The data, however, show that arbitrators 
are not importing their national law. For the UDRP to truly account for 
the nuanced distinctions between countries, it must do more than look 
to ccTLD dispute resolution policies. Thus, using ccTLD dispute reso-
lution procedures may not resolve the problem we are trying 
d s. Specifically, it will not provide guidance to panels about what le-
gal principles they should use to resolve a domain-name dispute. 
 For this reason, it is best to decide fair use domain-name disputes 
by reference to the trademark and unfair competition law(s) of each 
country. This kind of decision making also has benefits. Like a federal-
state system, it frees entities to craft new laws according to various cus-
toms. These customs approximate the values that permeate particular 
societies. Over time, individuals and societies compare the emerging 
legal rules with values. Based on this comparison, some rules are dis-
carded, revised, or retained. New rules also emerge. The proposed ap-
proach facilitates this process. It promo
 
258 Id. § 3.6(d). 
259 .au Dispute Resolution Policy (auDRP) (2010-05) § 4(c)(iii), .au Domain Admin. Ltd. 
(Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.auda.org.au/policies/auda-2010-05/ (stating as a right or 
legitimate interest that “you are making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the 
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to 
tarnish the name, trademark or service mark at issue”). 
260 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Country Code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs), 
World Intellectual Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/cctld/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 6, 2011) (“WIPO has provided advice to many ccTLDs with a view to establishing 
registration conditions and dispute resolution procedures that conform with international 
standards of intellectual property protection while taking into account the particular circum-
stances and needs of the individual ccTLD.”). 
261 For a list of auDRP disputes and those resolved by WIPO, for example, see auDRP Pro-
ceedings Archive, .au Domain Admin. Ltd., http://www.auda.org.au/audrp/proceedings- 
archive/ (last updated Nov. 16, 2011). 
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anced legal decision making s so by drawing on the re-
ur
eases, the UDRP will become more important. 
ith
favorable to respondents 
 36
aw. The “imported” law provided more protection to respon-
ent
 Despite the hazards of its current choice of law provision, ICANN 
do
. And, it doe
so ces and minds of the entire world. 
Conclusion 
 Revising and clarifying the choice of law provision will improve the 
functioning and enhance the legitimacy of the UDRP. What law applies 
in a UDRP dispute—fair use or otherwise—can determine who wins. As 
more people crawl the Web, an increasing number of individuals use 
domain names for a variety of purposes, including as comment, criti-
cism, personal, informational, and fan websites. The rise in Internet use 
is not likely to reduce the number of domain-name disputes.262 As the 
number of disputes incr
W out intervention, the effectiveness and fairness of the UDRP will 
likely suffer. To avoid this failure, ICANN should revise the current 
choice of law provision. 
 The results of my study show that U.S. respondents have an advan-
tage in fair use domain-name disputes; this Article calls this phenome-
non U.S. Favoritism. Specifically, U.S. respondents win in fair use cases 
35% of the time, compared to 17% of the time for other respondents. 
Additionally, U.S. panels rendered decisions 
in % of cases, compared to 20% for other panels. Although my study 
was limited to WIPO fair use cases, further study might reveal similar 
U.S. Favoritism in UDRP decisions generally. 
 U.S. Favoritism occurred for two reasons. First, the UDRP’s choice 
of law provision allowed panels to apply any country’s law in their com-
plete discretion. Second, U.S. panels took advantage of this provision at 
higher rates than their counterparts: they imported U.S. law into UDRP 
fair use cases more frequently than other panels—or, at the very least, 
other panels perceived U.S. law as generally more speech-friendly than 
non-U.S. l
d s than the UDRP as applied without reference to any country’s law. 
Once imported, the law replicated and now populates WIPO decisions 
as a rule. 
es not seem concerned with the issue. Recently, for example, ICANN 
                                                                                                                      
262 With the exception of 2009, the number of UDRP decisions decided by WIPO gen-
erally has risen each year since 2003. Total Number of Cases per Year, World Intellectual 
Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/cases.jsp (last visited Dec. 
20, 2011) (listing the numbers from 1999–2011 in ascending order: 1, 1857, 1557, 1207, 
1100, 1176, 1456, 1824, 2156, 2329, 2107, 2696, and 2390). 
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debated how to add new domain-name space to the Internet.263 Part of 
this process included formulating a dispute resolution procedure for 
domain names registered in this new space.264 Like the UDRP, disputes 
over these new online territories may favor certain parties if the choice 
of law issue is not settled. Unfortunately, ICANN’s new gTLD  dispute 
procedure ignores this issue. Instead, it allows legal objections to newly 
registered domain names based on “generally accepted and interna-
tionally recognized principles of law.”265 Although different from that 
in the current UDRP—which allows panels to apply “any . . . principles 
of law . . . [they] deem[] applicable”266—it is not likely to provide 
choice-of-law guidance for panels. The final draft of the new gTLD 
procedure allows “legal rights objections” for when the “applied-for 
gTLD string infringes the existing legal rights of the objector.”267 The 
new procedure does not take a stance on the choice of law issue and 
leaves it up to the panels; they decide what constitutes an “infringe-
ment” of legal rights. Panels also decide, when a limited public interest 
objection is filed, what constitute “general principles of international 
                                                                                                                      
263 Specifically, ICANN is adding new generic gTLDs, which the reader may recognize 
as the familiar “.com,” “.edu,” etc. Among the new gTLDs will be Internationalized Do-
ed Nos. Auth., http://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/ (last visited Dec. 
20, 2
available ar http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/new-gtld-drp-
clea
f a com-
mun tly or implicitly targeted” so requests). 
icant Guidebook, supra note 87, § 3.2.1. 
main Names (“IDNs”), which are “represented by local language characters, or letter equi-
valents.” Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 87. One example is “.テスト” (this kanji 
means “test” in Japanese), which would represent a Japanese IDN. Root Zone Database, In-
ternet Assign
011). 
264 ICANN has posted a new version of this dispute resolution procedure. See Internet 
Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., gTLD Applicant Guidebook: Module 3 § 3.1.2.2 
(2011), available at http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/objection-procedures-clean- 
19sep11-en.pdf (explaining that rights-holders can object by claiming that the new gTLD 
infringes a registered or unregistered trademark); id. § 3.4.2 (listing a variety of factors for a 
panel to consider). See generally Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., Attachment 
to Module 3: New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure (2011) [hereinafter Attach-
ment to Module 3], 
n-19sep11-en.pdf. 
265 Attachment to Module 3, supra note 264, art. 2(e)(ii) (allowing for an “Existing 
Legal Rights Objection” when “the string comprising the potential new gTLD infringes the 
existing legal rights of others that are recognized or enforceable under generally accepted 
and internationally recognized principles of law”); id. art. 2(e)(iii) (allowing for a “Limited 
Public Interest Objection” when “the string comprising the potential new gTLD is contrary 
to generally accepted legal norms relating to morality and public order that are recog-
nized under international principles of law”). The proposed procedure allows specific 
potential objections that are not based on any kind of legally recognized right. See id. art. 
2(e)(i) (specifying objections based on confusing similarity to an existing gTLD (not 
trademark)); id. art. 2(e)(iv) (specifying objection when a significant portion o
ity “to which the string may be explici
266 UDRP Rules, supra note 5, § 15(a). 
267 gTLD Appl
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law for morality and public order.”268 Still, the new procedure does not 
leave panels free to do whatever they choose; it lays out factors for pan-
els to consider when determining what these standards mean.269 In 
the
me holders. This has the potential to 
d
                                                                                                                     
o r words, ICANN prefers dispute resolution procedures that can, 
but need not, account for local law. 
 The findings of this study, however, suggest equivocating or avoid-
ing the choice of law issue will lead to favoritism of some nationality, or 
perhaps for existing domain-na
un ermine the legitimacy and efficacy of the UDRP as an international 
dispute resolution mechanism. 
 ICANN, of course, could prevent that from happening—and the 
time is ripe for it to do so. Recently, ICANN reviewed the UDRP. In Feb-
ruary 2011, the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) 
Council requested an Issue Report on “[h]ow the UDRP has addressed 
the problem of cybersquatting to date, and any insufficien-
cies/inequalities associated with the process.”270 Following a request for 
public comments, two community members identified safe harbors for 
free speech as an area that needs attention.271 The issue is all the more 
pressing given that the GNSO council previously resolved to make no 
action on at least one pressing free speech issue (Gripe Sites).272 ICANN 
issued a Final Report on the Current State of the Uniform Dispute Res-
olution (“Final Report”),273 which was submitted to the GNSO Council 
in October 2011.274 The GNSO Council will then consider whether “to 
commence a policy development process (PDP) on the UDRP” —that is, 
 
. 
3 (2011), available at gnso.icann.org/issues/udrp/udrp-final-issue-report-03oct11-
en.p
272
l classes of domains, 
such as offensive domain names, may present problems. 
Id. 
SO, ICANNWiki, http://icannwiki.com/index.php/GNSO 
(las
268 Id. § 3.5.3
269 Id. § 3.5. 
270 Margie Milam, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., Final GNSO Issue 
Report on the Current State of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Pol-
icy 1, 3
df. 
271 Id. at 37, Annex 2. 
 Id. at 35, Annex 1. 
Rough Consensus: Make no recommendation. The majority of RAPWG 
members expressed that gripe site and offensive domain names that use 
trademarks should be addressed in the context of cybersquatting and the 
UDRP for purposes of establishing consistent registration abuse policies in 
this area, and that creating special procedures for specia
273 Id. 
274 The GNSO Council is an ICANN organization that identifies and recommends 
changes to gTLD policies. GN
t modified Sept. 10, 2011). 
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RP.277 The GNSO Council has agreed, 
sputes. If ICANN makes these changes in the con-
text of fair use—and considered them for the UDRP at large—it would 
improve the UDRP. 
                                                                                                                     
the GNSO Council will decide whether to revise the UDRP.275 The Final 
Report recommends delaying a PDP until the new gTLD dispute-
resolution system—the Uniform-Rapid Suspension System (URS)—has 
operated for “at least eighteen months.”276 Because ICANN modeled 
the URS on the UDRP, it suggests that the data from the URS would in-
form any decision on the UD
and it will revisit the issue after receiving another ICANN staff report 
within the next eighteen months.278 
 Although ICANN has decided not to reform the UDRP immedi-
ately, it has left open the possibility that it will do so in the near future. 
When it next examines the issue, ICANN should consider the results of 
this study and the variety of studies and suggestions offered by others 
concerned with the UDRP. The results of this study show that panel 
assignment in fair use cases is different for U.S. and non-U.S. parties. 
And this panel assignment—along with a vague choice of law provi-
sion—helps explain what I call U.S. Favoritism: U.S. panels provide, 
and U.S. respondents receive, more favorable treatment than their 
counterparts in fair use disputes. U.S. Favoritism raises concerns of 
speech, fairness, predictability, and legitimacy. One way to address these 
concerns is to specify what law, if any, applies in fair use disputes. Doing 
so would likely require altering the panel assignment procedures. And 
that, in turn, should force two other beneficial changes. First, ICANN 
should make an otherwise secret panel-assignment procedure public. 
Second, ICANN should ensure panelists have knowledge of the law that 
applies in fair use di
 
275 See Milam, supra note 270, at 3. 
276 Id. at 4 (recommending “that a PDP on the UDRP not be initiated at this time”). 
277 Id. (stating that this “would allow the policy process to be informed by data regard-
ing the effectiveness of the URS, which was modeled on UDRP, to address the problem of 
cybersquatting”). 
278 E-mail from Glen de Saint Géry, GNSO Secretary, to GNSO Council (Dec. 16, 2011, 
02:58), available at http://gnso.icann.org/mailing-lists/archives/council/msg12522.html. 
RESOLVED further, the GNSO Council requests a new Issue Report on the 
current state of all rights protection mechanisms implemented for both exist-
ing and new gTLDs, including but not limited to, the UDRP and URS, should 
be delivered to the GNSO Council by no later than eighteen (18) months fol-
lowing the delegation of the first new gTLD. 
Id. 
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